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Communist parties in the European Parliament : the quest for legitimacy.

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COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY

A Dissertation Presented

By

John Foster Leich

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August, 1976

Department of Political Science


COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY


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
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ABSTRACT

Communist Parties in the European Parliament:

The Quest for Legitimacy

(August, 1976)

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Directed by: Professor Gerard Braunthal

Communist parties have been present in the European Parliament, the proto-legislature of the European Community, since 1969, despite the fact that traditional communist and Soviet policy is antagonistic toward the existence and further development of the Community. The Italian Communist Party joined the Parliament in 1969, and was followed by the Danish and French parties in 1973, and the Dutch in 1974.

The presence of these parties in the Parliament serves a two-fold legitimatizing function: it enhances the representativeness of the Parliament and provides it with an additional opposition voice, and it also adds to the legitimatization of the communist parties in their own national subsystems. The parties participate in the Parliament's work principally in the interest of domestic political objectives. Any parallel policies among the parties toward the construction of an integrated Europe are largely accidental convergences.

The Italian Communists have played the leading role in the Communist and Allies Group in the Parliament. They are committed to an increase in the Parliament's authority within the Community and to direct elections for the Parliament, with proportional representation. On these two points the Italians are in conflict with the other three Communist parties. The French Communist Party strongly defends French national interests and independence from Community control. The Danish and Dutch parties oppose their countries' membership in the European Community, and exercise their presence in order to prevent what they consider further damage being done.

In agricultural questions, the communists seek to protect the small farmers and to exercise some control over Community protectionist policies elsewhere in Europe. They attempt to tackle the problem of control of multinational corporations at the European level, and encourage communist trade union participation in European decision-making. They clearly distinguish between politico-economic integration and intra-European military arrangements. They have accepted the principle of multilateral trade negotiations by the EC, on behalf of the member states, with third countries including the Communist bloc.

The impact of the communist presence in the Parliament is difficult to determine for two reasons: awareness of and interest in the work of the Parliament is slight as

far as the general European public is concerned, while the mode of operation of the Parliament with its drive for consensus does not allow for the free play of measurable political differences. Nevertheless the Communist and Allies Group can be seen to serve in some respects as an opposition, raising difficult and unpopular questions and airing a viewpoint not otherwise heard in European institutions. Communist Parliament members have been particularly successful in raising issues involving human rights, the problems of small farmers, and trade union participation in EC actions.

In the Parliament the communists, unlike the other five political groups, often find themselves in an isolated position. However, when an opportunity for collaboration with the other groups is offered, the communists are quick to take advantage in order to secure the passage of resolutions in which they are interested. On the other hand, the mere fact of participation in the Parliament has not led to closer relations or a harmonization of policy among the parties in the Group.

The communist presence in the European Parliament can be regarded as one of the significant turning points in the development of "eurocommunism," or the determination of some Western communist parties to develop a type of socialism on a model which is quite distinct from that now existing in Western Europe, the Soviet Union or China.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CAG	Communist and Allies Group
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union
CESPE	Centro di Studi di Politica Economica
COREPER	Comité des Représentants Permanents
CP	Communist party
CPN	Communistische Partij van Nederland
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DC	Democrazia Cristiana
DKP	Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EC	European Community
ECG	European Conservative Group
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EPD	European Progressive Democrats (Group)
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
MSI	Movimento Sociale Italiano
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano
PDIUM	Partito Democratico Italiano di Unità Monarchica
PLI	Partito Liberale Italiano
PRI	Partito Repubblicano Italiano
PS	Parti Socialiste

PSDI	Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano
PSIUP	Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria
PSU	Parti Socialiste Unifié
REF	Réformateurs et Démocrates Sociaux
RG	Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche
RI	Républicains Indépendants
SFIO	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
SFP	Socialistisk Folkeparti
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SVP	Südtiroler Volkspartei
TVA	Tax on Value Added
UDR	Union des Démocrates pour la République
UK	United Kingdom

INTRODUCTION

When the first communist party joined the European Parliament in 1969, this move appeared to be so completely out of character and in conflict with the traditional communist attitude toward the Common Market that it seemed to me obvious that an appropriate area of political research would be the behavior of communist party members in this forum. The official Soviet position has been--and still is, for all practical purposes--that the European Community is an organization for the protection and benefit of West European and American monopoly capitalism, and is an inevitable adjunct in the exploitation of the European workingman. By contrast the West European communist parties, in particular the Italians, must have held a different view of the Community and must have had a different philosophy in mind when they decided to work within and not outside the institutional structure of the Common Market.

My research therefore has attempted (1) to determine, chiefly on the basis of a study of the parliamentary sessions between 1969 and 1975 and other related material, what objectives the communist parties are seeking through their participation in one of the governing organs of the European Community; (2) to assess the success or failure the parties have experienced in reaching these objectives; and

(3) to ascertain, if possible, whether or not there is now evolving a common policy of two or more West European communist parties toward the problems of the nine member states of the Community, such as might be described by the today popular but imprecise term of "eurocommunism."

It is a hypothesis of this paper that the presence of the communist party in the Parliament is directly related both to the legitimacy of the institutions of the European Community and to the legitimacy of these same parties within their own national subsystems. I have described this relationship as the legitimatizing role of the Communist and Allies Group in the European Parliament. I have also proceeded on the assumption that at this point in the political development of Western Europe democracy is an essential element of legitimacy, and that in turn parliamentary control over executive and bureaucratic action is one of the prerequisites of democracy. In this connection consideration has been given to the extent to which the communist parties function as an opposition in the European Parliament and with respect to other European institutions.

The research has involved a study of the composition, organization, and behavior of the Communist and Allies Parliamentary Group; and it has entailed a perusal of the record of the Parliament's debates for the six years in question, personal observation of three separate Parliamentary

sessions, interviews with Group members and their staff, the consultation of all pertinent monographic and secondary sources, and exchanges of views and ideas with the principal American and foreign experts in this particular field.

The approach of the paper is both historical and analytical, in the belief that through studying changes in political positions over a six year period a basic continuity of policy line can be deduced. Considerable attention has been paid to the differences in the approaches of the four communist parties concerned, since it is one of the goals of this paper to determine if a "eurocommunistic" approach to Europe does in fact exist. It is through the dialectic of differences that a greater precision in policy enunciation can be ascertained.

Tools for the measurement of the political impact of the communist presence in the European parliament are of necessity heterogeneous and approximative. Use has been made of public opinion surveys, tabulations of parliamentary statistics, personal biographies, and the impressions of those directly involved in the European Community's political process. The dramatic events of 1976 which are causing a reevaluation of West European communism have inevitably had their retroactive impact on the conclusions of this study.

CHAPTER I

STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Historical Development

The European Parliament (EP) is one of the four governing bodies of the European Community (EC). It shares authority with the policy-making Council of Ministers, who represent the nine member governments; with the EC executive organ, the European Commission, representing the Community as a whole; and with the European Court of Justice, the final authority on Community law. As a parliament, the EP is a unique institution. While it is not today a legislature in the sense of being a rule-making body, nor is it a parliament in the sense of being the core of responsible government for the EC, the EP is nonetheless a transnational organization with constantly but slowly increasing influence on the development of European policy; far different from the traditional international and European bodies such as the United Nations General Assembly, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, or even the Assembly of the West European Union.

The EP was born in 1952 as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Common Assembly owed its origin to the fact that certain sovereign functions with respect to the control of coal and steel industries had been transferred to the ECSC High Authority by the six founding members of the Community: France, Italy,

the German Federal Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Since these functions were no longer subject to the control of the national parliaments of the six founders, the Common Assembly was established to fill the gap. However, chiefly at the insistence of France, the Assembly was established as a consultative body, hardly able to hamper the supranational activity of the High Authority.¹

When the other two communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), were formed as a result of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Common Assembly was renamed the European Parliamentary Assembly and continued as a single body to perform the same function for the EEC and Euratom as it had for the ECSC. In 1967, when the three commission-type organs of each community were fused, the European Parliament assumed its present name without any change in function.

The original parliament had a membership of 142: 36 each from France, Germany, and Italy; 14 each from Belgium and the Netherlands; and 6 from Luxembourg. In 1973, when the EC was enlarged to nine member states, the EP was increased to 198, Britain being allotted 36 members, and Denmark and Ireland 10 each. After the British referendum in June, 1975, the Labor Party occupied its seats in the

1. Gerda Zellentin, "Form and Function of the Opposition in the European Communities," Government and Opposition, April-July, 1967, p. 417.

Maison de l'Europe in Strasbourg, and the EP was complete.

EP members are designated by their national parliaments according to procedures devised by each institution. Until now the EC has exercised no control over parliamentary membership, other than to require that EP members be members of their national parliament at the time of their designation. Direct elections of EP members are due to be instituted in 1978, as will be further described below.

Organization of the EP

The EP meets once each month for a four or five day session, except for the month of August. Parliamentary committees meet more frequently. All but two of the plenary sessions are held in Strasbourg, the remainder are held in Luxembourg. The secretariat and administrative headquarters of the Parliament are in Luxembourg.

The EP is the only Community institution whose proceedings are conducted in public. Plenary sessions are open; committee sessions are private. The sessions are conducted in the six different languages of the EC, with simultaneous translations. Documentation is also available in the six languages.

The EP has twelve standing committees, covering political matters, economics and finance, budget, agriculture, social affairs (labor), public health, legal affairs,

transport and regional policy, cultural affairs, energy research and technology, development and cooperation (with associated states), and external economic relations (with the rest of the world). The Parliament is run by a Bureau, elected for one year, consisting of the President and twelve vice presidents, and--by courtesy--the chairman of the political groups. As the Presidential Committee (or Enlarged Bureau), the Bureau, the group chairmen, and the chairmen of the twelve standing committees together set the agenda, committee assignments, the disposal of questions, and the like, for the Parliament. The Enlarged Bureau may invite EC Commissioners or Council members to attend its meetings for the purpose of coordination and information.

The political groups are uniquely important to the work of the EP.² Unlike other international bodies, ever since 1958 the members of the EP have grouped themselves not by nationality but by political persuasion. In Strasbourg and Luxembourg they take their seats from right to left as in a national parliament. Today there are six political groups in the EP, from right to left: Liberals (25), European Progressive Democrats (17), Conservatives (20), Christian Democrats (51), Socialists (64), and Communists (15). The European Progressive Democrats consist of

2. John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants., England: Saxon House, D.C. Heath, Ltd., 1975), p. 24.

twelve French Gaullists and five Irish Fianna Fáil members. The Conservatives include, in addition to the British members, two Danes. In order to cope with delicate problems of nomenclature and esoteric differentiation, the Liberals and Communists each include the term "and allies" in their title. There is also a small number of independents sitting toward either end of the chamber, three to the right (Italian neo-fascists) and three to the left (two Walloons and one Irish independent member of the House of Lords).

Increasingly it has been through these groups that decisions over appointments, agenda, and matters of parliamentary policy have been taken.³ Group cohesiveness is high, with a maximum deviation from unanimity in roll call votes in 1963-66 of 17.6 percent in the case of the Liberal and Allies Group, while the average for all groups was 9.7 percent.⁴ In the case of the Communist and Allies Group, which was not formed until 1973, the deviation is probably less than one percent.⁵ Group cohesion is substantially higher than cohesion on a national basis. In 1963-66 the maximum deviation by nationality, in the case of Germany, was

3. Ibid., p. 41.

4. Zellentin, op. cit., p. 420.

5. This cohesiveness index may be deceptive. Roll call votes are infrequent in the EP, and CAG delegates are often intentionally absent by national groups when a vote is called. Those present generally vote "abstain."

26.5 percent, while the average for all nationalities was 15.5 percent.⁶

When the Parliament is seized of a particular topic, either in the form of a request for an opinion by the Council or on its own initiative, the matter is referred to the appropriate standing committee. The committee appoints a rapporteur, who drafts a report and presents the committee's decision on the matter to the plenary. Usually the report includes a motion for parliamentary action. After discussion the motion is voted, often by a voice vote or show of hands. Roll call and secret ballots are rare.⁷

Mode of Operation

The EP participates in the development of Community policy by expressing its opinion on proposals of the Council of Ministers, posing written and oral questions, and exercising a very limited financial control. In broad terms, within the EC institutional structure it is the thirteen-man professional Commission, appointed by the nine member governments, which is charged with taking the initiative in actions designed to fulfill the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, for

6. Zellentin, loc. cit.

7. This fact makes it difficult to quantify EP decisions in terms of group cohesiveness, and to assess the impact of individuals or groups on these decisions.

submission to the Council for approval. The Council, representing the nine governments, is the rule-making body of the EC, making decisions generally on the basis of unanimity, although majority rule is provided in some cases. The role of the Parliament is one of consultation or concertation. Under the Treaty, the EP has the power to censure or to force the Commission to resign as a group, a power which because of its sledge-hammer-like nature has never been exercised.

In practice the EP is also consulted informally by the Commission during the course of the drafting of its initiatives. As a result a sort of alliance has developed between Parliament and Commission whereby the EP has been able in a small degree to convert the Commission into its own spokesman vis-a-vis the Council.⁸ A Commission member is always present during the Parliament's discussion of measures proposed by the Council. A similar procedure applies to treaties, where the opinion of the EP is elicited by the Council prior to the treaty's final ratification.

It should be noted that neither in the case of Council resolutions nor treaties is the opinion of the EP considered binding. Frequently the Commission supports the Parliament's proposed amendments, but it is not obliged to do so. Similarly the Council may also amend its own resolutions or other action in accordance with the Parliament's

8. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 53.

suggestions, but it also is not obliged by the Treaty to accept the Parliament's conclusions.

A more effective means of influencing EC action is through the institution of the parliamentary question, whereby EP members, committees, or groups may interrogate members of the Council or Commission, either orally or in writing, on matters of Community interest. The fact that these questions are usually debated in plenary EP sessions means that, potentially at least, public attention may be attracted to the Parliament's assiduousness in pursuing possible injustice, inequities, treaty violations, or other improprieties on the part of either Council or Commission in their conduct of the work of the EC. However, the fact that the EP sessions appear to arouse public or press interest only under very exceptional circumstances may serve to negate much of the force which the questioning function of the Parliament would otherwise command.

Power of the Purse

In one area alone, that of budgetary control, the EP has after a long struggle developed a very small measure of direct influence on the EC policy-making process. Since 1975 the overwhelming portion of the EC's budget has come not from contributions from the nine members but from the Community's own resources: customs levies, penalties on imports, and a small share of the tax on value added (TVA) which is

now uniform throughout the EC. Also, since 1975 the EP has been given full authority to reduce or to increase within certain limits the EC's budget for so-called non-obligatory expenditures. In the category of obligatory expenditures fall those items which are required by the Treaty of Rome, such as expenditures from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the European Social Fund, in other words nearly all the program expenditures of the EC. Non-obligatory expenditures therefore concern chiefly the administrative portion or only about 4 percent of the EC budget, although this represents a portion of considerable nuisance value. As far as obligatory expenditures are concerned, the Parliament's role remains that of being required to be consulted by the Council and of being entitled to express its opinion.⁹

The EP also plays a role, jointly with the Council, in the audit of EC expenditures. An auditor's committee, appointed by the Council, reports to both organs; and both are required to give discharge to the Commission on the proper expenditure of budgeted funds. The implications of this new function, which was provided for in the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970 and has only now come into effect, are still unclear.¹⁰

9. David Coombes, The Power of the Purse in the European Communities (London: Chatham House: PEP, 1972), p. 30 ff.

10. Ibid., p. 73.

Proposals for the Future

The question of the powers of the EP is a matter of continuing concern, as more and more of the authority of the member states is transferred to the institutions of the Community. This process of transfer raises the question of the legitimacy of the EC institutions, particularly with respect to their susceptibility to testing for democratic characteristics in both form and methods of procedure.

Together with the increased budgetary powers approved in the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970, the EC has been considering a proposal to enlarge the legislative powers of the Parliament, the so-called "Vedel Report."¹¹ This report proposes a system of co-decision between the Parliament and the Council, whereby the Council would have to respond to parliamentary opinions with alternative proposals in an on-going process which would eventually result in a fully agreed solution. The Vedel Report also proposes that co-decision be applied to the selection of the President of the Commission by the member governments, and that the other Commissioners then be appointed by him, thus constituting a sort of parliamentary investiture for the Commission as a

11. Commission of the European Communities, Report of the Working Party Examining the Problem of the Enlargement of the Powers of the European Parliament, "Report Vedel" (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1972).

more realistic and viable counterpart to the Parliament's power of dismissal.

While the Vedel Report sidesteps the question of direct election of the EP members as not essential to the implementation of the reforms it proposes, the direct elections provide a third element, together with the budgetary and legislative reforms, in the Parliament's continuing effort to enhance its legitimatizing role in the European Community.¹²

12. For a discussion of the current direct elections proposal, see pp. 30-36 and 62-67 below.

C H A P T E R I I

THE LEGITIMATIZING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Legitimacy and its Elements in a Democratic System

At the risk of proliferating neologisms in an already overcrowded field, I have opted for the word "legitimatization" as the term to describe, with Seymour Lipset, "the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society."¹ Thus the European Parliament is exercising this capacity when it performs a legitimatizing role on behalf of the European Community as a whole. If we define legitimacy with Richard M. Merelman as "the quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime,"² then legitimacy is the outcome of the legitimatization process, whereby the aforementioned belief is engendered, just as democracy is the outcome of the process of democratization. But legitimacy is more than the outcome in terms of individual decisions. As Robert A. Dahl points out, legitimacy arises from a belief not only in the rightness of a decision, but

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1. Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), p. 86.
 2. Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LX (Sept., 1966), p. 548.

also the rightness of the process by which that decision has been reached.³ Merelman's "oughtness" and Dahl's "rightness" must therefore refer to both the outputs and the mode of operation of the system in question.

Neither the EP nor the EC as a whole is today fully invested with legitimacy in the sense of Lipset's definition. The representativeness of the Community institutions and their responsiveness to popular control are open to question. The entire conception and structure of the Community constitute a radical departure in political behavior. Guglielmo Ferrero has said that legitimacy "is never a natural, spontaneous, simple, and immediate condition."⁴ No government or institution is born legitimate; a certain period of time is required before this attribute can be ascribed to the phenomenon in question. It is with this time lag that this paper will be concerned.

As a political institution, the EP invokes both the output and the mode of operation aspects of legitimacy. The outputs produced by the Parliament are in the form of recommendations to and criticisms of the actions of the other organs of the Community. These recommendations and criticisms are formulated by means of a procedure which involves

3. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 46n.

4. Guglielmo Ferrero, The Principles of Power (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), pp. 138-139.

confidential and public discussion, recourse to expert advice, and the principle of majority decision by representatives of all the significant European political parties. If this procedure whereby EP outputs are reached is recognized as legitimate, then these formally non-binding opinions and resolutions of the EP will gain in authority and persuasiveness. In other words, they will increasingly acquire the attribute of legitimacy, and in so doing will legitimize the EC actions to which they refer.

In this discussion legitimacy will be considered in its contemporary Western context, wherein, as Giovanni Sartori has explained, an essential element thereof is democracy.⁵ To Max Weber's fourth category of legitimacy, the belief in the legality of those outcomes which are correct in form and have been made in the customary manner,⁶ will be added a further embellishment, by positing a democratically chosen authority which is behaving in accordance with generally accepted democratic norms as a further essential of legitimacy. This is not the point at which to embark upon a full discussion of the definition of democracy and democratic procedure. This presentation will be confined to the statement, along with Dahl, that the existence of an opposition is

5. Giovanni Sartori, "Democracy," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 ed., IV, 112.

6. Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 37.

perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself; and that "the absence of an opposition is evidence if not always conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy."⁷ Furthermore, the term "opposition" will be defined--again with Dahl--as a group within a particular political system which cannot definitively determine the conduct of that system and which is opposed to the way in which the government of the system is conducted by those who can make such a determination.⁸ While it is possible to conceive of an oppositionless political system which still operates in accordance with democratic precepts, these same precepts presuppose the admissibility of an opposition should one materialize.

The obverse of the requirement of the existence of an opposition as a constituent element of democracy is representativeness, or the degree to which formal arrangements exist whereby conflicting or divergent views within a system may be and are in fact expressed during the decision-making process. This is a somewhat more rigorous definition than that of Sartori, who describes a political system as democratic when it has as its kernel a collective body that is "free

7. Robert A. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. xviii.

8. Ibid. cf. H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 149.

enough to express a diversity of views and interests."⁹ Assuming that the decisions of the body established by these formal arrangements are reached by a majority vote, which--with limitations--is probably another key principle of democracy,¹⁰ it follows that the minority will by definition be the opposition, or that group within the system which is opposed to but unable to control the policy of the institution in question.

The role of any parliament as a means of popular control over governmental action poses a much debated question today.¹¹ If we regard such control as another key element of democracy in today's world, we find that it is two-fold in nature. The parliament itself must be subject to popular control in the form of periodic elections at agreed intervals in which candidates representing conflicting or divergent views may and do in fact participate. In turn the "government" of the system, whether it emanates directly

9. Giovanni Sartori, "Representation: Representational Systems," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968 ed., Vol. XIII, 470.

10. H. B. Mayo, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-202.

11. Willard N. Hogan, Representative Government and European Integration (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 204-208. Cf: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research and Documentation, Symposium on European Integration and the Future of Parliaments in Europe. Summary Report, PE 36 967 (Luxembourg: 1974).

from the parliament or not, must be subject to what David Coombes calls the parliament's managerial function.¹² This function concerns itself with the fairness, appropriateness, and efficiency of governmental action, and is exercised by some institutionalized means of control over the selection or retention of the personnel of the government, means of scrutiny and inquiry into their actions, and an ultimate sanction in the form of the control of appropriations.

Within this broad framework, a great deal of variety in terms of institutional forms and behavior may obtain. Provided, however, that the above elements are present in some form, a regime of parliamentary control may be said to be in operation, which will serve to contribute to the legitimatization of the regime in question.

The Problem of Democratic Control
in International and Supranational Organizations

The European Community is generally recognized as a supranational, as distinguished from international, organization. This means that the nine national states which are members of the organization have transferred certain sovereign rights to decide particular matters of policy to the supranational organization they have created for this purpose.

12. European Parliament, Symposium on European Integration and the Future of Parliaments in Europe, Introductory Paper to Studies of National Parliaments, Note by Professor David Coombes, PE 35, 275 (Luxembourg, 1974), p. 3.

Thus the right to fix tariffs on imports, to make trade agreements with third countries, to regulate the production of coal, steel and agricultural products, as well as many other rights, have been vested in the Community organs. The fact that the Council of Ministers may operate on the principle of unanimity in these matters does not militate against its supranationality for the purposes of this discussion. In the first place, many of the EC decisions, especially in matters of detail, are made by the Commission, which is not responsible to the member states' governments, but is subject to policy control by the Council and to an as yet unused censure and dismissal authority of the Parliament. Furthermore, having once taken the steps required to pool their authority over specific matters such as occurred with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, it has now become virtually impossible for the member states to become disentangled functionally from the joint decision-making process. This was clearly illustrated by the French experience in trying to escape from the commitments of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1965.¹³

13. In an effort to assert French control over EC decision-making, General de Gaulle resorted to a boycott of the institutions of the EC. When the other EC members made it clear that they proposed to continue the Community, and perhaps even replace France with Britain, de Gaulle was forced to abandon his boycott by powerful forces of French industry. These interests, who had formerly supported the General, had invested too much in the future of the Common Market to be left in an isolated position, and began publicly to criticize the President's policy. In January, 1966, French delegates returned to their empty chairs having gained little or no advantage for France from the boycott. Cf: W. Hartley Clark, The Politics of the Common Market (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 136.

The requirement of democratic control poses particular problems in supranational organizations. Simply stated, supranationality removes the decision-making process one step further from the basic controls which the electorate and parliament exercise over the governments of the member states. Tariffs, trade agreements, and the regulation of industry and agriculture are no longer subject to ratification or concurrence by the parliaments of the member states. At the same time no alternative has yet been devised, not excepting the European Parliament, which could exercise the control formerly the province of the national parliaments while maintaining the supranational character of the decision-making process. It is toward an improvement of the parliamentary control process by the European Parliament that much of the thought on institutional reorganization of the European Community is now being directed. The question of direct elections for members of the EP, its budgetary powers, and its role in the projected political union of Europe are all matters which arise from this deficiency in the element of popular control over executive action, and the concomitant deficiency in legitimacy.

The problem is formidable. As James A. Caporaso has pointed out, there is an almost total absence of democratic institutions at the Community level.¹⁴ Political parties are not organized at the European level, but remain

14. James A. Caporaso, The Structure and Function of European Integration (Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 68-69.

national detachments with national goals. The EP's only serious power, that of dissolution of the Commission, is too clumsy for practical implementation, let alone against what has now become the EP's ally in a struggle to wrest authority from the Council. The Parliament is often consulted too late in the decision-making process to make even its advisory function meaningful. Finally, the Council of Ministers, the ultimate decision maker, is responsible to no one at the European level, and is scarcely amenable to control by the national parliaments.¹⁵

The Erosion of National Parliamentary Control
over Executive Action

The problem of what Karlheinz Neunreither calls a "legitimacy deficiency (Legitimationsdefizit)"¹⁶ afflicts not only the EC, but the national governments as well, as

- 15 In recent years the control problem has been compounded by the creation of the Council's Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). This body, selected at the ambassadorial level, reviews and makes recommendations on Commission initiatives. In areas outside the Commission's competence, it is COREPER which is charged by the Council with drafting projects for Community legislation. Commissioner Altiero Spinelli has called COREPER "a sort of Chamber of States in embryo...[which] takes part in the legislative function of the Community." (Spinelli, The European Adventure [London: Charles Knight & Co., Ltd., 1972], pp. 170-172. Cf: Fitzmaurice, op. cit., pp. 7-8).
16. Karlheinz Neunreither, "Legitimationsprobleme in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft" (paper presented at the Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Organisation und Integration der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft meeting in Tübingen, June 20, 1975), p. 11.

parliamentary control over executive action has progressively become less effective. Legislative initiative more and more has become concentrated in the cabinets of the European national governments. Because of the existence of stable parliamentary majorities in eight of the nine member states, Italy being for the present the exception, little real opposition arises with respect to government proposed measures or programs. Even when legislatures do take the initiative, the final decision-making authority is in many instances transferred to the cabinet, and thence--because of the technical complexity of many of the necessary implementing decisions--to the permanent bureaucracy which is one step further removed from popular control.

Between elections, the opposition in a European system of cabinet government is confined to the role of a critic who can be visibly effective only within the parliamentary arena, where he can directly confront the governing majority. The efficacy of the opposition--by definition a minority which is unable to exercise definitive control over the policy of the government to which it is opposed--is further weakened by the transfer of the decision-making authority outside of the range in which the critic is still effective. As the decision-making authority moves from legislature to cabinet and then often on to the bureaucracy, the opposition's leverage continues to diminish.

The legitimacy deficiency arising from the

weakening of the role of the opposition at the national level is compounded when the decision-making authority is transferred to the supranational level. As the Dutch EP member, Hendrikus Vredeling, pointed out, the shift of decision-making authority from the national parliament to the EC Council of Ministers favors the government party whose representative alone sits in the Council, and over whom the majority party still exercises a degree of control. The opposition, however, is not only unrepresented but is indeed at a disadvantage when it comes to criticizing the national representative on the Council, who can always claim to have defended the national interest after difficult and necessarily secret negotiations within the Council, and thereby render the opposition's attacks unpatriotic and unpopular.¹⁷

In most cases, national representatives on the Council are responsible to the member governments and not directly to the national parliaments, while representatives on the Commission (two each for the big countries, one each for the little ones), being non-political experts appointed jointly by all nine governments, are even further removed from influence by the national opposition in their countries of origin. Furthermore, the complexity and technical nature of the questions dealt with by EC institutions makes it

12. Hendrikus Vredeling, "The Common Market of Political Parties," in The New Politics of European Integration, ed. by Ghilja Ionescu (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 126.

difficult to control the actions of these institutions through the development of an informed public opinion, sufficiently sophisticated to be able to criticize EC measures intelligently and effectively.

There is one school of thought, represented by Willard Hogan, which deserves attention in this connection.¹⁸ Hogan holds that the presumption that parliamentary control is a prerequisite of representative government and democracy is a fallacious one, and that to compare the European Parliament in this respect to a national parliament is an error. National parliamentary control arose from the need to curb excessive or arbitrary royal power and to ensure that public policy would be responsive to popular needs and desires. Because of the lack of similarity between the institutional structure of the EC and this traditional national pattern, the need for parliamentary control at the EC level has been exaggerated. "The Commission is not a Louis XIV or Charles I"¹⁹ and the Council, having no power of initiation, cannot take matters into its own hands. It is a mistake to assume that only elected officials have a representative character. An independent, essentially professional and technical body such as the Commission can be just as representative of Europe's needs and desires in its field of competence as an

18. Willard N. Hogan, op. cit.

19. Ibid., p. 207.

elected body. Hogan argues that the separation of powers inherent in the four-way division of the EC's institutions--the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court--is an adequate safeguard of the public interest, and that all this talk about parliamentary control is merely a misapplication of a national model to a supranational institution. Hogan's view would, however, still appear to be that of the minority; and under the principle of majority rule, we must cast it aside as not controlling.

The European Parliament and Legitimacy

Representativeness. It would be difficult to describe the European Parliament as it is now constituted as a fully representative organization. In the first place, the breakdown by national units results in a very crude model of representation, in which the smaller nations are heavily over-represented in proportion to their populations. The four largest countries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) each have thirty-six members. The next in size (Belgium and the Netherlands), each of which has about 20 percent of the population of the average of the largest countries, with fourteen seats has almost 40 percent as many representatives as the largest members. The next group (Denmark and Ireland), each of which has a population of less than 10 percent of the average of the largest countries, with ten seats has more than 25 percent as many representatives; while the smallest

country (Luxembourg), with a population less than 1 percent of that of the largest countries, has with six seats over 15 percent as many representatives.

Nor is the breakdown of the various national delegations an accurate reflection of the popular votes in the most recent electoral consultations. One reason for this is of course the fact that the various national electoral systems are not commensurate. Three of the nine member nations (France, Ireland, and the UK) have single member electoral districts, while the rest have some form of proportional representation. The following tables show one example from each system, and the lack of proportion which is evident in each case.

TABLE 1-A.--France.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Share of popular vote, 1973 (first round)</u>	<u>No. of seats this would give in EP</u>	<u>Actual No. of seats held by Party</u>
UDR-RI ²⁰	38.48%	14	16
PS and Allies	21.65	8	9
PCF	21.26	8	4
Centre Democratique	12.43	4	2
Others	6.16	2	4

20. See list of abbreviations following the Table of Contents of this study.

TABLE 1-B.--Italy.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Share of popular vote, 1972</u>	<u>No. of seats this would give in EP</u>	<u>Actual No. of seats held by party</u>
DC+SVP	38.8%	14	16
PCI+In.Sin.	27.2	10	9
PSI	9.6	3	4
PSDI	5.1	2	2
PLI	3.9	1	1
PRI	2.9	1	1
MSI	8.7	3	3

The disparities in the French delegation may be explained in part by the fact that the 1973 run-off election showed a sharp drop in votes for the Centre Démocratique, a slight decrease in the PCF vote, and a moderate increase in the Socialist and UDR-RI vote. It is interesting to note that in the case of both France and Italy the communist parties appear to be under-represented, while the Socialists are slightly over-represented in comparison with the most recent evidence of their electoral strength. The Italian Communist Party's (PCI) gains in the 1975 municipal and regional elections (confirmed in the legislative elections of 1976) could be cited as well as evidence of a further and continuing disparity in this regard. The two-seat discrepancy in the representation of the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) is explained by the fact that the South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP), which votes with the DC, has been allotted one

representative each from the Italian Senate and Chamber, a representation the symbolic importance of which outweighs the fact of the smallness of its popular vote. In the case of France, the system of a run-off election (scrutin d'arrondissement à deux tours), when there is no majority in the first round, tends to favor the larger parties, such as the UDR, in terms of the total members of the Assemblée Nationale elected. This advantage is in turn reflected in the composition of the European Parliament delegation, which was selected by the French legislature following the March, 1973, elections.

The small size of the Danish and Dutch delegations makes it difficult to reflect with any accuracy the latest electoral results in the party composition of the delegation. In the case of Denmark, the January 9, 1975, election returns contrast with the present composition of the Danish EP delegation as follows:

TABLE 1-C.--Denmark.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Share of popular vote, 1975</u>	<u>No. of seats this would give in EP</u>	<u>Actual No. of seats held by party</u>
Social Democrats	29.9%	3	3
Radical Liberal	7.0	1	1
Conservative	5.5	1	0
Socialist People's ²¹ and Communist	9.1	1	1

21. Results for these two parties are combined, since they had agreed to the designation of one common delegate for both parties to the EP.

TABLE 1-C.--Denmark - continued

<u>Party</u>	<u>Share of popular vote, 1975</u>	<u>No. of seats this would give in EP</u>	<u>Actual No. of seats held by party</u>
Centre Democrats	2.1%	0	1
Christian People's	5.5	1	0
Liberal	23.3	2	3
Progress	13.6	1	1

The present EP delegation thus appears not to reflect the losses suffered by the Centre Democrats at the last election, and to over-represent slightly the Liberal Party. In general, however, the left-wing parties should not have cause for complaint.

The Netherlands delegation is based on the elections of 1972, the results of which offer little contrast in comparison with the present composition of the EP delegation.

TABLE 1-D.--Netherlands

<u>Party</u>	<u>Share of popular vote, 1972</u>	<u>No. of seats this would give in EP</u>	<u>Actual No. of seats held by party</u>
Liberals	14.4%	2+	3
Anti-Revolutionary	8.8	1	1
Christian-Historical	6.3	1	1
Catholic's People	17.7	2+	3
Socialists	27.4	4	5
Democrats '66	4.2	1-	0
Communists	4.5	1-	1

From this table it can be seen that the only disproportion in the delegation arises from the fact that the fractional seats have been assigned on the basis of the rule of "to him that has shall be given." The three largest parties, the Liberals, Catholic People's, and Socialists, share between them most of the fractional seats, while the Communists barely squeeze in under the minimum.

Having admitted these structural inequities in the patterns of national and political party representations in the European Parliament, we may now return to our criterion of representativeness, namely: the degree to which all significant conflicting or divergent views may be and are in fact expressed during the decision-making process. Taking as a model the four delegations in which communist party members are present we see that there is a wide range of opinion divergence expressed. At one end of the spectrum stands the PCI, which has adopted a policy of working for change within the existing framework which would lead to a strengthening of the Parliament's role in the EC. More or less in the middle stands the French Communist Party (PCF), which is much less committed to the success of the EC in principle and is wary of any increase in the authority of EC institutions. At the opposite end we find the Danish Socialist People's Party (SFP), whose representative continuously reiterates his party's opposition to Denmark's membership in the EC, and the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN),

whose representative--at least through the June, 1975, session--had not even taken the opportunity of making his party's views known on this or any subject during the course of the parliamentary sessions he attended. Similar spectra of opinion differences are to be found in the other EP political groups, particularly those such as the Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats, in which more than two nationalities are represented.

From the time that the British Labor Party agreed to take up its seats in Strasbourg in the July Session of 1975, no significant political trend (i.e., with the exception of extremist and fringe groups) has been boycotting or absent from the EC institutions for reasons of principle.

Proposed Direct Elections for EP Members. In December, 1975, the summit of the heads of government of the Nine (the so-called European Council) agreed to hold direct elections for the members of the European Parliament in May or June, 1978. Provision was made whereby those countries "who for technical reasons might not be ready for such elections," as Britain and Denmark had indicated might be the case, could continue to appoint their delegations.²² This decision was taken pursuant to Article 138 of the Rome Treaty which called upon the Assembly (European Parliament) to "draw up proposals for election by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all member states."

22. New York Times, December 3, 1975.

At its January 1975 session, the Parliament adopted a second Draft Convention on Elections to the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage. An earlier convention on the same subject, adopted in 1960, had been ignored by the Council of Ministers, and was now out of date, as a result of the enlargement of the EC to nine members. The 1975 draft, the so-called Patijn Report, named for the Dutch Socialist deputy who was rapporteur for this subject, calls for an increase in the membership of the EP from 198 to 355 members, to be elected simultaneously on the same day for a five year term under the electoral rules of each nation, pending the drafting of a proposal--no later than 1980--for a uniform electoral system. Members of national parliaments would not be disqualified from candidacy for the European Parliament. Article VIII of the draft states that the provisions governing the admission of political parties to elections in each member state shall apply to elections to the European Parliament. Apparently the proposed uniform electoral system would stop short of deciding which parties could present candidates in each national area.

According to the Patijn report, the national breakdown of the 355 parliamentary members would be:

Germany	71
United Kingdom	67
Italy	66
France	65
Netherlands	27
Belgium	23
Denmark	17

Ireland	13
Luxembourg	6

This distribution was reached as the result of a formula which can be applied to new members or to important demographic changes over the years. The formula is as follows:

1. Up to a population of one million each state receives six seats.
2. States with a population between one million and 2.5 million are given a further six seats.
3. Up to a population of five million each state receives one further seat for each additional 500,000 inhabitants.
4. For a population of between five million and ten million each state receives one further seat for each additional 750,000 inhabitants.
5. For a population of between ten million and fifty million each state receives one further seat for each additional one million inhabitants or part thereof.
6. For a population exceeding fifty million each state receives one further seat for each additional 1.5 million inhabitants or part thereof.

On July 12, 1976, the summit meeting of the European Council in Brussels approved a slightly different distribution, largely in response to French objections to the smaller number of seats allotted to that nation (65 in contrast with Germany's 71). The new distribution calls for 81 seats for each of the four largest countries (Germany, the UK, Italy and France), 25 for the Netherlands, 24 for Belgium, 16 for Denmark, 15 to Ireland, and 6 to Luxembourg, for a total Parliament of 410 members. The press reports of the Council meeting do not indicate what formula was used to reach these new figures, except to point out that the distribution would facilitate a solution

of Britain's problems with her minority nationalities. Eighty-one seats, for example, would enable both Catholics and Protestants from Northern Ireland to be represented in the UK delegation.²³

Under the present system for the selection of European Parliament members, the Communist and Allies Group (CAG) in the Parliament consists of fifteen parliamentarians (nine Italians, four French, one Danish, and one Dutch), or 7.65 percent of the total membership of 196. This is less than the percentage of the total communist vote in the most recent legislative elections in the nine European member countries. In these elections the communist share of the result has been:

TABLE 2.--Communist Vote.²⁴

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Date of Election</u>
Belgium	3.2	1974
Denmark (DKP only) ²⁵	4.2	1975
France	21.3	1973
Germany	.3	1972
Great Britain	.1	1974
Ireland (no CP candidates)	--	1973

23. New York Times, July 13, 1976.

24. L'Espresso, December 12, 1975.

25. The Danish member of the CAG belongs to the SFP, but claims to represent the DKP as well. If SFP votes were added to this figure, the percentage of course would be higher.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Date of Election</u>
Italy	27.2	1972
Luxembourg	10.4	1974
Netherlands	4.5	1972

These statistics would indicate that if direct elections for a European Parliament are held in each of the Nine in 1978, with the electoral system now being used to elect national parliaments, the communist representation in the new parliament will increase from 7.6 percent to at least 9.9 percent. It is therefore not surprising that the PCI has consistently pressed for direct elections to the European Parliament. This has been with an eye to the future as well. When and if Portugal and Greece join the Community, communist representation should further increase to 10.2 percent, based on the 1975 and 1974 elections in these two countries respectively. The addition of Spain, where no free elections have as yet been held in recent years, may even raise this figure a percentage point or two more.

What is surprising is the fact that the PCF and the Danish SFP have both consistently opposed direct elections to the Parliament. The reason for the PCF's opposition, as we shall see later in detail, is the party's insistence that French sovereignty not be impaired by supranational

institutional arrangements,²⁶ while the SFP is following the reservations expressed by two successive Danish governments since Denmark's accession to the EC, as well as reenforcing the party's own opposition to Denmark's continued membership.²⁷

The PCI has also demanded a further qualification in the direct election proposal, to wit: that the election be by proportional representation in all countries. Such a requirement would in all likelihood permit communist participation in the Luxembourg delegation, increase the PCF participation, and possibly result in the election of a Belgian CP representative. The Luxembourg CP at present has 6 seats in the country's 56 seat legislature, while the Belgian CP has 5 out of 212.

Interest in direct elections with proportional representation is not confined to the CAG. In Britain, both the Liberal Party and the Welsh and Scottish Nationalist Parties are strong backers of the proposal. The Liberals see EP elections with proportional representation as a first step to a PR system for the Parliament at Westminster, which would substantially increase the Liberal's representation; while the Nationalists see it as an important step toward

26. Gérard Bordu, Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, 14 January, 1975, pp. 64-65 (hereinafter cited as "Debates").

27. Jens Maigaard, Debates, 29 April, 1975, p. 45.

Welsh and Scottish autonomy and eventual independence.²⁸

The Opposition's Role Within the System. According to Gerda Zellentin, the communist parties were originally deliberately excluded from the Common Assembly of the ECSC, predecessor of the European Parliament, by the six founding governments in order to further the development of consensus in the Assembly and the other organs of the Community.²⁹ Since 1969, however, when communist party representation in the EP began, somewhat to the surprise of outside observers the communist parties have appeared to behave like traditional opposition parties, criticizing and attempting to prevent the passage of measures with which they are in disagreement.³⁰ They have played the rules of the parliamentary game, made use of such acceptable techniques as oral and written questions, attempted filibusters and the destruction of credibility through the citing of new evidence and the impugning of the motives of other EP members and of representatives of the Commission.

The communist parties are not alone in performing an opposition function in the EP. In the first place, the

28. Interview with U. W. Kitzinger, editor of Journal of Common Market Studies, Oxford, June 1, 1976.

29. Zellentin, op. cit., p. 423. Cf: Enrico Vinci, Il Parlamento Europeo (Milan: G. Giuffrè, 1968), pp. 53-54.

30. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

role of the opposition in the EP is quite different from that which it plays in a national legislature. The EP has no elective role with respect to the executive of the community, and its majority does not necessarily support the program submitted to the Parliament by the policy initiating and making organizations of the EC, the Council of Ministers and the Commission. There is thus no continuing focus of cohesion for those groups in the EP who oppose particular aspects of Community policy, no dialogue between government and opposition such as one finds in most European national parliaments. Furthermore, the communist parties are merely one of several opposition groups, along with the Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, etc., depending on the issue at hand. However, the communist parties may be said still to have the character of a "major structural opposition," in the words of R. A. Dahl,³¹ in that their goal is still ultimately to change the economic structure in which the EC operates, and to adjust the political structure and institutions of the EC in order to achieve this economical goal.

At the same time, the communist parties have chosen to perform this structural opposition function within and not outside the institutional framework of the EC; and in this fashion, they do in fact contribute to the legitimatization of the Community structure. A consensus thus exists within

31. Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. 342.

the Parliament, not on the future economic structure of Europe, nor on the nature of the political institutions which are to determine this structure, but upon the existence of the EC as an inevitable stage in reaching any economic goal whatever, given the present power relationships in Europe, and the rest of the world.

The Opposition's Sub-system Role. The degree to which the communist parties' presence in the European Parliament contributes to its legitimacy bears a direct relationship to the role of the communist parties in each of the European national subsystems. In none of the present members of the community is the communist party illegal. In five of the Nine, communist parties shared in coalition rule in the immediate post-World War II period.³² Communist representatives sit in six of the nine national parliaments.³³ In Italy, a "historic compromise" has been offered by the PCI, consisting of a Communist-Christian Democratic coalition, as an alternative to the present governing majority. In France the Programme Commun of Communists, Socialists, and left-wing Radicals presents itself as an alternative to the Gaullist majority. In Denmark, the passive support of the SFP, which represents Denmark's communists in the European Parliament, may be necessary for the success of some of the government's

32. France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Denmark.

33. All but the UK, Ireland, and Germany.

programs, in view of the slimness of its majority in the Folketing. As long as there was no foreseeable possibility of the communists' peacefully coming to power, either as a majority in themselves or in a coalition with other left-wing parties, their presence or absence from the parliament of the national subsystem did not, as in the case of Germany before the legalization of the (West) German Communist Party, significantly affect the legitimacy of the Federal Republic. These circumstances have, however, now changed dramatically; and to exclude the communist parties from the political life of any of the nine EC member states is evidently no longer acceptable to the majority of each electorate concerned.

However, as Neunreither has pointed out, the shift of functions from the subsystem parliaments to the bureaucracy of the EC has seriously weakened the role of the national opposition and has made discussion or agreement on European problems at the subsystem level notably more difficult. At the same time, because of the notoriety of the PCI's delegation to the EP and its intelligent exploitation of its position at Strasbourg, both internally and externally (with which this paper will later deal), the Italian party for one has been able to enhance its own legitimacy at the sub-system level, assisted in no small measure by the legitimacy deficit of the governing majority.³⁴

34. Neunreither, op. cit., p. 12.

In the case of France, the relative unacceptability of the EC to the subsystem as a whole, and to the PCF for specific reasons, means that the party's role at Strasbourg can only with difficulty--and largely through negative actions--be exploited in order to increase its legitimacy in the sub-system. Not only does the PCF often find itself in agreement with its UDR countrymen at Strasbourg, it must also continue to reject the EC to the extent that it perceives the supranational organization as representing both a threat to French sovereignty and an instrumentality of the European capitalists as a class, led by German and American monopolists.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST PARTY PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Background

The Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, established the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. When the treaty came up for ratification in the national parliaments of the six member nations, communist parliamentarians wherever present voted unanimously against ratification. In an apparent effort to frustrate or delay ratification of the Rome Treaty, the PCI and PCF held a five day meeting in Rome in December, 1958. At this, and at a subsequent meeting of the communist parties of the Six in April, 1959, the participants agreed to fight against the implementation of the Common Market as a tool of monopoly capitalism which reenforces imperialism and the exploitation of the European working class, and which, as the economic basis of NATO and support for German militarism, constitutes a threat to world peace.¹ In essence, this viewpoint reflected the Soviet attitude which had been elaborated in the Moscow Institute for World Economy and International

1. "Déclaration Commune des Délégations etc.," Cahiers du Communisme, XXXV, 1-2 (January-February, 1959), pp. 134-140; "Déclaration Commune des Représentants etc.," Cahiers du Communisme, XXXV, 4 (April, 1959) pp. 404-408.

Relations' Theses on the Imperialist Integration of Western Europe.²

These theses held that the Common Market was an alliance of the monopolies and states of Western Europe, subject to American control, which had the additional tasks of constituting an aggressive wedge against the socialist countries, of exercising a type of indirect collective colonialism over the developing countries, and of making possible a common front against the demands of their own working class.³

The general stand of the Soviet Union had not always been so categorically opposed to European integration. Indeed, before 1914 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had taken a positive stance toward a United States of Europe, and his position changed only gradually during the course of World War I. After 1917, with the failure of the revolutionary spark to take hold in Central Europe and the revival of the capitalist economies there, Lenin became completely opposed to European union. Thus it is not difficult for communist theoreticians to invoke Leninist principles in favor of international integration when they so desire, backed up

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2. Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1/1957, pp. 83-96; World Marxist Review, V, 11 (November, 1962).
 3. Summarized in Heinz Timmermann, "Westeuropas Kommunisten und die Europäische Gemeinschaft," Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung II, 3 (1972), 5-38.

with Karl Marx's vigorous internationalism.⁴

In the late 1950's, however, both the PCI and the PCF were essentially in agreement with the Soviet line. The PCI warned of

. . . the grave and real danger that the whole Italian economy, except for certain large monopolistic sectors, would be transformed by the Common Market into a great depressed area, with grave consequences for an important part of our population;⁵

while the PCF held that the EC would "organize a common misery and unemployment for the population."⁶

Since 1957, the overall position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on the EC has changed very little. Shortly before the Moscow Conference on Contemporary Capitalism, in the summer of 1962, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations published a revised version of the Theses on European Integration, which no longer stressed the complete subordination of the European economy to United States monopoly capital, but recognized that European economic integration was weakening American leadership. The Common Market was not simply a plot of the

4. Gerda Zellentin, Die Kommunisten und die Einigung Europas (Frankfurt/Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1964), p. 49.
5. "Sul Mercato comune europeo," Comunicato della Direzione del PCI, March 24, 1957, in Documenti politici e direttive, pp. 44-49, quoted in Donald Blackmer, Unity in Diversity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), p. 153.
6. Henri Jourdain essay, Economie et Politique 100/101, (November, 1962), 9, quoted in Timmermann, op. cit., p. 11.

imperialists but a "new phenomenon in the development of the capitalist economy," which because of its very existence had contributed to the obvious growth of prosperity in Western Europe.⁷

This slight concession to the realities of life in Western Europe was reechoed in 1972 by Leonid Brezhnev in his March 20 speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress. On this occasion the Soviet leader called "absurd" the thought that the proposal to hold a European Security Conference was designed to torpedo the Common Market, and that the Soviet Union

. . . was far from unaware of the developing situation in Western Europe...including the existence of...the Common Market. [The USSR is] attentively observing the activities of the Common Market and its evolution.⁸

In the same year, 1972, a new edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia described the EC as:

. . . a state-monopolistic organization...a new phenomenon arising from the circumstances of the contemporary state of the general crises of capitalism...[and] reflecting the characteristic objective tendency of the monopolistic stage of capitalism to internationalize economic relations and capital, to liquidate narrow boundaries, as Lenin in his time explained. He stressed that capitalism ... "unites all countries in the world in a single economic whole," and that... "a capitalist enterprise inevitably

7. Pravda, August 2, 1962. Cf: M.M. Maksimova, Ekonomicheskie Gruppyrovki v Zapadnoy Evrope (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1969), pp. 36-43, which purports to be a monograph on economic groupings in Western Europe, but does not even mention the EP as one of the organs of the EEC!

8. Pravda, March 21, 1972.

outgrows the boundaries of the local market, region, and finally the state."

According to the Encyclopedia, the EC is directed against the world communist movement, the socialist countries, and the struggles for national liberation of the colonial and dependent peoples. Supported originally by the USA as an economic base for NATO, the EC has now become an economic competitor to the US, and "the hopes of strengthening have not been justified." However, the EC has not been able to ensure a crisis-free equal development nor to moderate the class contradictions of the member states. In a bow, perhaps, to the West European communist parties, the Encyclopedia says:

The working masses of the six countries openly protest against the anti-democratic character of the EC; and they demand that it be given a new and profound economic and social content, distinct from its present one, which would correspond to the interests of the wide masses of the people.⁹

The position of the PCI had meanwhile changed sharply from that which it had held in 1958. By 1960, at the 81-Party Congress in Moscow, the Italians were already arguing that Western Europe was becoming increasingly prosperous and more and more independent of the United States. This circumstance implied that there was a role for the West European communist parties to play in encouraging the contradictions between Europe and America, and that this role could be played by the communist parties in the European

9. Bol'shaia Sovetskaiia Entsiklopediia, Tret'e Izdanie (1972), IV, 28.

organizations themselves:

The very act of denouncing the activities of the monopolies and mobilizing the masses of the workers can be facilitated by the presence of the legitimate representatives of the working class in these organizations.¹⁰

The first concrete steps to establish relations with the EC were taken by the PCI-controlled trade union, the Confederazione Generale Italiana di Lavoro (CGIL), whose strong socialist minority membership forced the communist majority to a more independent and flexible behavior, before the party itself was ready to do so.¹¹ The CGIL proposed at the communist-controlled 1962 World Free Trade Union (WFTU) Congress in Leipzig the foundation of a WFTU liaison office with the EC in Brussels. Since the other communist trade unions were cool to this proposal, the CGIL proceeded alone, and opened such an office in March, 1963. Then, in 1965 the CGIL was joined by the PCF-controlled Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in the liaison office in Brussels. The Italian trade unions have continuously remained in the forefront in pushing for greater collaboration with the EC. The CGIL has now been joined in a federation with the Social Democratic Unione Italiana di Lavoro (UIL) and the Christian

10. "Promemoria della delegazione italiana alla commissione preparatoria," Interventi della delegazione del Partito Comunista Italiano alla Conferenza degli 81 Partiti comunisti ed operai (Rome: A cura della Sezione centrale di Stampa e propaganda della Direzione del PCI, January 15, 1962), pp. 39-40, cited in Blackmer, op. cit., pp. 175-176.

11. Timmermann, op. cit., p. 12.

Democratic Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Liberi (CISL); and they together have joined the Confederation of European Trade Unions (CETU), the essentially non-communist roof organization of all the trade unions in the EC countries. As of the summer of 1975, the application of the French CGT for admission into the CETU was still being considered in Brussels. The CGT is the only large national trade union organization not a member of the CETU. Opposition to the admission of the CGIL and the CGT into the CETU has come chiefly from the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), a non-partisan but strongly anti-communist grouping, and from the French Socialist Force Ouvrière (FO) trade unions, who also opposed the admission of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) on the same anti-communist ideological grounds.¹²

Renewal of the Italian EP Delegation, 1969

The first opportunity for the PCI to participate in the European Parliament arose in 1968, when the Italian delegation to that body was finally renewed. Although in 1958 both the PSI and the PCI had asked to be included in the first Italian delegation to the EP, they were excluded by a majority vote of the Italian Parliament, both parties being at that time firmly in the opposition camp. The PCF

12. I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo, Bollettino d'informazione a cura del Segretariato del Gruppo, 1974/1, pp. 25-28.

was similarly excluded from the original French delegation to the EP.¹³

The Italian delegation selected in 1958 (by an outgoing Parliament) reflected the composition of the governing majority of that year, plus the extreme right, whose votes were needed in order to designate the delegation by an absolute majority.¹⁴ The partisan breakdown of the 1958 Italian delegation was as follows:

Governing majority:

DC	28
PSDI	2
PLI	2
PRI	1

Right wing opposition:

MSI	2
PNM-PMP (Monarchists)	1

Fate, both personal and political, was not kind to this first Italian delegation to the EP. Between 1958 and 1963, two members of the delegation died and were not replaced. The national elections of 1963 effected a considerable change in the composition of the Italian Parliament.

13. "Cassio" (N. Dell'Omodarme), "La Delegazione Italiana al P.E.," Comuni d'Europa, XVI, 3, March, 1968, p. 5. The exclusion of the opposition from the delegation in 1958 followed a pattern established in 1949, when the Italian delegation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was selected, and repeated in 1952, when delegates to the ECSC Common Assembly were chosen.

14. The French delegation appointed in 1958 under similar rules included 16 UNR-UDT (governing majority), 7 SFIO, 2 MRP, and 11 independents.

Not only did five members of the EP delegation lose their national seats; but also, in part as a result of this election's outcome, the PSI became a part of the governing coalition. This shift of the PSI from opposition to governing majority was an element in the apertura a sinistra (opening to the left), which was to set the pattern for most Italian governments since that date.

Italian constitutional lawyers have interpreted the rules concerning representation in the EP to mean that a delegate must be a member of the national parliament at the moment of his designation, but not necessarily during the entire period of his European mandate.¹⁵ The legislature elected in 1963 made no effort to replace those delegates who had lost their seats in that election; and these therefore continued as EP members, despite the objections of other national delegations.¹⁶ Between 1963 and 1968, four additional delegation members passed away without replacement; and one, Eduardo Martino, had to resign as a member of the EP, because he had been appointed to the EC Commission. Six others had been appointed to the ministerial functions in Italy. Traditionally in the case of other national delegations, EP members who were appointed to ministerial positions gave

15. Cf: Monaco, "Caratteri istituzionali della Comunita economica europea," Rivista di diritto internazionale, XLI, 1 (1958), p. 30, cited in Vinci, op. cit., 5ln.

16. "Cassio," op. cit., p. 7.

up their EP mandate, out of respect for the institutional equilibrium within the EC between the EP, representing the national parliaments, and the Council of Ministers, which represents the national governments.¹⁷ Two further EP members had other full time jobs. In practice, only 13 of the original 36 members of the first Italian delegation turned up regularly in Strasbourg to participate in the Parliament's work.¹⁸

This deficiency in the Italian representation was not only damaging to Italy's interests, it also meant a greater burden for the other members of the EP, who had to assume the Italian's share of committee work. What made the matter even more pressing was the fact that it was now Italy's turn to have the presidency of the Parliament, in the person of that country's former Prime Minister, Mario Scelba. According to an informed parliamentary staff member, the other European parliamentarians made the acceptance of Scelba's candidacy contingent upon a renewal of the Italian representation in the Parliament.¹⁹ EC Chairman Jean Rey described as "shocking and abnormal" the fact that Italy had not renewed her representation in the European Parliament for

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 6.

19. Author's confidential interview, Strasbourg, July 2, 1969. cf: John Foster Leich, "The Italian Communists and the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, IX, 4 (June, 1971), 273-274.

for several years, while the other five member countries renewed their representations on the basis of each new general election. Rey further maintained that he could not understand why the communist party members who had seats in the Belgian, French and Italian parliaments should be excluded from the Strasbourg assembly.²⁰

Meanwhile the situation within Italy had changed considerably. As noted, the PSI from 1963 onward has supported the governing majority in the Center-Left coalition; and its chairman, Pietro Nenni, was serving as Vice Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in successive Center-Left governments. Giuseppe Saragat, head of the PSDI and at the time Foreign Minister, in a TV appearance on November 5, 1964, called for the inclusion of the PCI in the Italian EP representation.²¹ The Italian general elections of May 19, 1968, resulted in a further increase in the communist vote, a trend which has been continuous since the end of World War II. In addition, a new break-away socialist party, the Partito Socialista Italiano d'Unità Proletaria (PSIUP), gained 4.5 percent of the total vote and 23 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Those who joined PSIUP disapproved of the PSI cooperation with the center parties and participation in the Center-Left governments. In the Chamber of Deputies, PSIUP

20. Ibid. It is unclear why Rey omitted Luxembourg, with a 10 percent communist vote.

21. Cited in "Cassio," Ibid., 7n. Cf: L'Unità, November 6, 1964.

members generally voted with the PCI. The share of the right wing parties in the 1968 national vote, PLI, MSI, and PDIUM (United Monarchists), declined from 13.8 percent to 11.6 percent.

A new Italian delegation was therefore appointed at the end of 1968 whose members took their seats at the beginning of the next EP session, in March, 1969; and Mario Scelba was duly elected president of the EP on that date. The partisan breakdown of the new 36-member delegation was as follows:

Center-Left majority:

DC	15
SVP	1 (seated with DC)
PSI-PSDI	6
PRI	1 (seated with Socialists)

Opposition:

Right Wing:

PLI	2
PDIUM	1 (seated with PLI)
MSI	1 (seated with PLI)

Left Wing:

PCI	7
PSIUP	1 (seated with PCI)
Independent	1 (seated with PCI)

This delegation was unbalanced in two respects.

Inevitably, undue weight was given to the very small parties (PDIUM and SVP) in order for them to be represented at all. The delegation also was weighted in favor of the DC, who polled only 39.1 percent of the popular vote, and would have therefore been entitled to 14 and not 15 seats, not including

the extra seat for the SVP. The socialist group also had one more seat than their share of the poll would indicate; and the communists were one or two short, depending on whether you count the one Independent or not. The PCI was quick to call attention to this discrepancy when their delegation arrived in Strasbourg.²²

Following the 1972 general elections, the Italian delegation was reapportioned as is shown on Table 1-B (page 26) above.

PCI Participation in the EP, 1969-1973

In 1969 the Italian left-wing opposition EP members, seven PSI, one PSIUP, and one independent, did not comprise the necessary fourteen delegates required in order to form a parliamentary group. Instead, they were listed--together with one French independent, a communist sympathizer--as non-inscrits or "non-aligned." Such a designation seemed to be both lacking in logic, and in fact to place the communists under certain parliamentary disadvantages which they were quick to point out, and which have been discussed on pp. 3-6, above.

Giorgio Amendola, the leader of the PCI (non-inscrit) "group", set forth the party's position with respect to institutional arrangements in his maiden speech on March

22. Amendola, Débats, 12 Mars, 1969, p. 38. (Pre-1973 French-only edition of official journal cited on p. 27 n.l.).

12, 1969. He began by pointing out that while a "discrimination which had lasted for years" was now eliminated, the PCI still did not have its full share of representatives. Had the EP been elected by universal suffrage with proportional representation, the number of communist members then present would have been greater. Amendola claimed that if the votes of the PCI, the PSIUP, and those who had voted for the old Partito d'Azione of Senator Ferruccio Parri (the independent member of the "group") were counted together, then every third Italian elector could have been shown to have voted for this trend. "If you want...to establish a link with European public opinion," Amendola told his EP colleagues, "you must count on the forces which we represent in our countries and in Europe."

Amendola then attempted to dispose of the "pretext" that the communists had voted against the Treaty of Rome and therefore were excluded from the EP. He said:

Our opposition to the Treaty of Rome did not mean that we did not recognize the necessity of economic and political collaboration among the European countries and regions. Nor, on the other hand, has our opposition ever reached the point of denying or ignoring the reality which was developing, the reality of a process of economic integration, even if this process has been concretely controlled by important American and European monopolistic forces.

The communists did oppose the creation of the EEC because it constituted a new divisive factor, owing to the nature of its origin, in the center of Europe.

The EEC arose from the climate of the cold war, in the framework of a policy directed toward the

maintenance and reenforcement of opposing economic, political and military blocs.

Now that "for the first time" it had been recognized that there was a crisis in the construction of the EC, Amendola explained that the communists wanted to contribute to a solution of this crisis, first of all by pointing out its origin in the relationships which existed between the EC and the United States. The EC had not been able to meet the American challenge at the technological level or at the level of monopolistic economic control. This in turn was due in part to the fact that the working class in Western Europe was divided both nationally and internationally. If a unification of Europe was to be accomplished, this would have to be accompanied by an "overcoming" (superamento) and liquidation of the opposing military blocs, and by progress in the unity of the Left in all European countries, in the fight for peace and for socialist democracy.

Amendola made clear also that the PCI, while it was alone among the European communist parties in the EP, believed that it represented ideally the communists of the other countries as well, or at least

. . . [a] current of ideas and forces which is an essential element of European and worldwide reality. This reality can be fought against, but it cannot be ignored.²³

23. Ibid., p. 38 ff.

Despite the fact that the PCI members did not constitute an official parliamentary group, certain "facilities" were accorded to them by the EP. PCI members were appointed to committees on the basis of one per committee. In plenary sessions they were allotted the same speaking opportunities as other groups, and speakers on behalf of all the PCI members and their associates were given priority over individual speakers. Eventually the "group" was allotted two staff members. Nevertheless, without official group status, the communists continued to suffer some serious disabilities in comparison with the other parties. None of their members were eligible for the presidency or one of the several vice-presidencies of the EP, nor could they sit in the bureaus as committee officers, nor be rapporteurs. Neither could communists sit in the Enlarged Bureau of the EP, the organization which sets the EP agenda and determines policy and administrative matters, including the EP's own budget.²⁴

During the four years that the PCI delegates were the only communists in the European Parliament, some of the basic lines and problems of Italian communist policy became clear; and in many cases these have continued unchanged down to the present day. The first problem is an institutional one: the extent to which the PCI's desire to "reform" the institutional structure of the EP is in conflict with the

24. Leich, op. cit., p. 275. Cf: Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 129.

party's persistent insistence on a freedom of action for Italy in matters of direct concern to the PCI's constituencies. The dichotomy was stated by Amendola in his March 12, 1969, speech, in which he called for a revision of the Treaty of Rome which would

. . . assure a policy of real economic cooperation among the European nations, while respecting the autonomy and policy of each country and of each national parliament.²⁵

The question of the international competence of the EC was from the beginning linked by the PCI to the problem of direct elections, with their usual qualification of "by the method of proportional representation." It was the PCI's position that as long as there were no Europe-wide elections for the European Parliament, the PCI would regard the EC merely as an economic union of limited objectives, not competent to take political decisions.²⁶ The PCI also proposed that the unanimity principle continue to be respected in the voting by the Council of Ministers, despite the Treaty of Rome requirement for the eventual introduction of a qualified majority vote, in the interest of protecting the weaker member states. At the November, 1971, round-table discussion on the Italian communists and Europe in Rome, it was also suggested that the members of the Commission no longer merely be appointed by the several

25. Amendola, loc. cit.

26. Author's interview with Leonilde Iotti, August 10, 1969.

governments but that they be elected by the national parliaments with a qualified majority, on the nomination of the governments, and with the agreement of the European Parliament. This would give the Commission members, to whom sovereignty was de facto being transferred, a greater degree of representativeness and a closer relationship to the basic organs of national sovereignty, the parliaments.²⁷ A portion of this rather complicated suggested procedure was incorporated into the Vedel Report on the enlargement of powers of the EP in 1972.²⁸

In practical terms, however, the PCI representative did not hesitate to press for immediate greater parliamentary control over those matters for which the national parliaments had already turned the right of decision over to the Council and the Commission. Thus we see Leonilde Iotti²⁹ and Silvio Leonardi³⁰ in 1969, Francescopaolo D'Angelosante in 1970,³¹ Fazio Fabbrini in 1971³² and Franco

27. Leonilde Iotti, "Sovranità nazionale e istituzioni comunitarie," I Comunisti Italiani e l'Europa, Quaderni di Politica ed Economia, Supplemento al n. 6 (novembre-dicembre 1971) della rivista bimestrale del CESPE, p. 81.

28. See pp. 10-11 above.

29. Iotti, Débats, 7 octobre, 1969, pp. 48-50. Signora Iotti is widow of long-time PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti.

30. Leonardi, Débats, 10 décembre, 1969, pp. 75-76.

31. D'Angelosante, Débats, 11 mars, 1970, pp. 59-61; 13 mai, 1970, pp. 89-90.

32. Fabbrini, Débats, 16 novembre, 1971, pp. 47-48.

Boiardi in 1972,³³ all advocating a greater EP control over the EC's own resources on the grounds that the national parliaments had been deprived of their control function in this respect, and that the EP was the only suitable organ remaining that represented, "even if in an indirect way," the sovereignty of the people³⁴ which could logically be consulted.

The judgment of the PCI, upon entering the EP, concerning the Community's industrial integration was generally negative. The results were regarded as bad for Italy, bad for the Italian working man, and perhaps bad for Europe as a whole.³⁵ This unfavorable judgment as to the results of economic integration was bolstered by a PCI belief that the piecemeal, functional approach of the EC to economic problems, without an overall plan, made it possible for forces external to the Community to step in and take control over the European economy.³⁶ Had there been adequate democratic control over EC action, these opportunities for

33. Boiardi, Colloque Parlementaire Européen, l'état de l'unification européenne et le rôle des Parlements (Strasbourg: European Parliament, 1972), pp. 40-46.

34. Iotti, "Sovranità nazionale," p. 81.

35. Leonardi, "Il Processo di integrazione nella Cee," I Comunisti Italiani e l'Europa, pp. 19-54.

36. Ibid. Cf: Nicola Cipolla e Luigi Conte, "La crisi della politica agricola del Mec," I Comunisti Italiani e l'Europa, pp. 55-78.

intervention on the part of the multinational corporations might not have arisen. The multinationals, in the PCI's opinion, were the true beneficiaries, together with their supporter, the United States. This position of negativism toward the EC integration and its impact on Italian industry was reechoed in the strongly protectionist stand the PCI adopted toward the effects of integration on Italian agriculture.

In the 1969-73 period the PCI came strongly to the defense of small Italian farmers, wine-growers, and horticulturalists. For example, the PCI strongly protested against the rather miserly provisions for the retraining of Italian tobacco growers who were to be forced out of jobs as a result of the introduction of a free internal European tobacco market. It was bad enough that the proposed regulation of the tobacco industry placed the Italian small farmers at the mercy of the German and Dutch tobacco cartels. The plan also seemed to be lacking in any adequate concern for the fate of the displaced farmers. Similarly, the PCI made vigorous efforts to protect the Italian citrus fruit growers on the grounds that EC association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, by lowering the tariffs on North African citrus products, perpetuated a colonial relationship.³⁷

37. Leich, op. cit., pp. 278-279.

The French Communists Enter the EP, 1973

The originally antagonistic position toward the EC taken by the PCI, PCF, and other West European communist parties had been largely a PCF construction, and bore the mark of the generally more conservative and dogmatic stance of the French party, which was attempting to enlist the support of the CPSU in its own struggle for supremacy among the West European communist parties.³⁸ Ten years later, the situation was quite changed. Already in 1969, Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa, of the International Section of the PCI Central Committee, in their booklet on the subject, Pour ou Contre l'Europe, demanded that the PCF be admitted into the EP, despite all the deficiencies and impotence of this organization.³⁹ The PCF should be present, they said, in order to defend the claims of the working masses, when matters of European security and policy were under discussion. The Common Market now existed, and had established a network of relations within the French economy which could not be broken without serious damage. What was needed was a joint effort of all the progressive and left-wing forces in Europe to carry out a common action against the monopolistic aspects of the Common Market, in favor of democratization of its

38. Timmermann, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

39. J. Denis et J. Kanapa, Pour ou Contre l'Europe (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969), p. 142. Since 1974, Kanapa, now a member of the PCF Politburo, has been chief of the International Section of the Central Committee.

institutions, and in the interest of European security. This should take place on several fronts at once, such as a united European trade union effort, but under no circumstances by increasing the supranational authority of the EC institutions.⁴⁰

Thus from the beginning, the PCF has made the principle of French sovereign independence the cornerstone of its policy toward the EC, has opposed any extension of the Parliament's powers at the expense of the member states, and has strongly opposed the institution of direct elections for EP members.⁴¹

On June 27, 1972, the French Communist and Socialist Parties agreed to a Programme Commun de Gouvernement, which contained an entire chapter devoted to France and the EC. This program represented a considerable step toward a more positive appreciation of the EC by the PCF. Apparently at the urging of their partners, the French socialists,⁴² the PCF agreed that they would

. . . participate in the development of the EC's institutions and policies, with the desire to liberate the Community from the domination of big capital, to democratize its institutions, to support the demands of the workers, and to direct (orienter) the Community's actions in the workers' interest.⁴³

40. Ibid., pp. 220-221.

41. Ibid., pp. 212-213.

42. Timmermann, op. cit., p. 14

43. Programme Commun de Gouvernement du Parti Communiste Français et du Parti Socialiste, préface de Georges Marchais (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972), p. 177.

At the same time, the PCF and PS agreed that they would . . . preserve within the Common Market their freedom of action for the realization of their political, economic, and social program.⁴⁴

The program went on to say that since the European Parliament was called upon to approve the EC budget in any case, it should be allowed to control its execution. Direct election of EP members was not mentioned in the program.

The French parliamentary elections of March, 1973, resulted in the PCF's winning 73, or about one-seventh of the 490 seats in the National Assembly, whereas PCF candidates polled over one-fifth of the popular vote in the first round of the elections. The French electoral system gives a parliamentary advantage to the party having a relative majority, in this case the UDR. Following the elections, three PCF members were appointed to the French delegation in Strasbourg, and a fourth was added during the course of the year. The arrival of the French delegates, together with the Italian and Danish delegate already on hand, meant that the necessary figure of fourteen like-minded members of the EP were now present; and the Communist and Allies Group could be formally constituted.

44. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST AND ALLIES GROUP TO JUNE, 1975

Characteristics of CAG Membership

One has the distinct impression that the members of the CAG are generally of greater political weight and perhaps better qualified professionally and technically than are those of other EP groups.¹ A resumé of the backgrounds of the CAG members would tend to confirm this impression. However, standards of comparison are difficult to establish because--unlike the members of other EP groups-- neither the PCI nor the PCF has had the opportunity of occupying national leadership posts in the government of their respective countries since the immediate aftermath of World War II. In other respects, however, a comparison of the eight PCI members with the fourteen Italian DC members shows the following facts:

1. The two groups are the same average age (c. 55).
2. The PCI members have a slightly longer average experience in both the EP and in the Italian Parliament.
3. Proportionately, a greater number of PCI members come from the innermost circle (direzione) of the party (Amendola, Iotti) than the DC members (Andreotti, Scelba).
4. With respect to specialization at the national level, the PCI delegation is weighted in favor of

1. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 131.

agricultural, budget, and finance problems, while the DC delegation is more diversified.

Comparable data for the four PCF and the ten UDR delegates show that;

1. The average age of the PCF members is somewhat younger than that of the UDR.
2. In proportion to the time they have been present in the EP, the PCF members have as a whole had a longer experience in both the EP and the National Assembly.
3. Proportionately, a greater number of PCF members come from the inner circle (Comité Politique) of the party (Ansart) than in the case of the UDR (Kaspereit). Two of the four PCF members are members of their party's Comité Centrale, while only three of the ten UDR members are of the Comité Centrale level.
4. Data with respect to specialization is not available.

The numbers involved in the Danish and Dutch delegations, both communist and non-communist, are too small to permit a meaningful comparison.

CAG Policy and Objectives in the EP

Policy Rationale. CAG overall policy and objectives in the EP, as distinct from the individual policies of the four parties which compose the group, are based primarily on domestic considerations and only secondarily on considerations touching upon the solidarity of the working class, the future of the communist movement as a whole, or the state of development of capitalism in Western Europe today.

These domestic considerations vary considerably among the four countries, and overlap only slightly in matters of substance. There is, however, some parallelism in the tactical response of each, which might be described as a common means of meeting dissimilar problems. For example, each of the component parties sees its presence in the CAG as instrumental to the improvements of its electoral position at home in foreseeable future consultations. Each party makes use of its presence at Strasbourg--as a component of the group--in order to increase its exposure abroad in a manner which will be reflected favorably in the domestic press. All the group members, regardless of whether they condone their own country's presence in the EC, support the principle of communist representation in the European Parliament and its expansion to include all those eligible communist parties who may not yet be members. All of the parties agree that a qualitative change has taken place in the transnational development of capitalism in Western Europe, and that this change requires action at some international level in order to bring it under control.²

When dealing with substantive matters, however, it cannot be said that the CAG has a group policy. As will be explained in Chapter IV, great differences exist between the

2. Cf: Rainer Klaus, Die Gründe für das veränderte Verhalten des Partito Comunista Italiano gegenüber der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Free University of Berlin, 1974). pp. 104-154.

PCI and the PCF and between the two big parties and the two small ones. These differences mean that there is no group policy toward institutional change in the EC--including the questions of direct elections and the EP budgetary powers--no group policy toward the control of multinational corporations, nor even toward matters involving détente and the overcoming of military blocs.

This dialectical interplay of domestic concerns and the international institutional expression thereof may be illustrated by looking at several specific issues and seeing how the CAG and/or the individual party's policy is reflected in each.

Institutional Questions. The basis for an overall CAG policy toward the institution of the European Community and its component parts--if such a group policy could be said to exist--may be found in the Political Declaration of the Communist Parties of Capitalist Europe, signed in Brussels on January 28, 1974. This declaration recognizes the lack of consensus among communist parties in their attitudes toward the EC:

Des situations diverses se présentent aujourd'hui pour les pays d'Europe occidentale. Dans certains pays pour lesquels leur appartenance à la CEE depuis quinze ans a tissé des liens économiques étroits, les Partis Communistes luttent contre son orientation monopoliste et ses conséquences, ainsi que pour sa démocratisation. Dans d'autres pays dont l'adhésion au Marché Commun est toute récente, les partis communistes agissent par contre pour le retrait total de la CEE. Dans les pays ouesteuropéens non membres ou associés, les partis communistes luttent contre les tentatives d'inclure leur

pays dans la sphère d'influence des monopoles qui dominent la CEE.

Diversity of objective is thus openly admitted. However, there is still unity as well:

Malgré cette variété de situations, les partis communistes des pays capitalistes d'Europe réaffirment qu'une réponse commune à la politique d'intégration économique est possible et nécessaire. . . . [Il faut] faire prévaloir. . . des solutions conformes aux intérêts de tous [les peuples d'Europe].

Thus the PCI and the PCF fight against the "monopolistic orientation" of the EC and strive for the "democratization" of the Community, while the Dutch and Danish parties express their opposition to their countries' membership, and avoid any act which would increase their countries' commitment to the EC, its goals, and its supranational authority.

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3. Les Communistes Italiens, Bulletin pour l'Étranger publié par le PCI, janvier-fevrier, 1974, pp. 18-34; also L'Unità, January 31, 1974. No official English translation of this resolution exists. It reads as follows: "The countries of Western Europe are faced with differing situations. In some countries, whose fifteen years membership in the EEC woven close economic ties, the Communist Parties are fighting against the monopolistic orientation of the Community and its consequences, as well as for a democratization of the EC. In other countries, which have only recently joined the Common Market, the Communist Parties are, on the other hand, working for a total withdrawal from the EEC. In the West European countries which are not members or associates, the Communists are fighting against attempts to include their countries in the sphere of influence of the monopolies which dominate the EEC. . . . Despite this variety of situations, the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries of Europe reaffirm that a common response to the policy of economic integration is possible and necessary. . . . Solutions which are in accord with the interests of all the peoples of Europe must be made to prevail.

Unity of objectives is at best a formal one of an acte de présence of the CAG as a unit at Strasbourg.

Furthermore, in practice this agreement to disagree has meant that there has been a good deal of variety, not to say inconsistency, in the approach of individual CAG spokesmen toward institutional problems, not only between delegates of different nationalities but also in statements made by individual group members of the same nationality. Also, a speaker of one nationality who identifies himself as a Group spokesman may be followed by another, also speaking in the name of the Group, who takes quite a different point of view.

1. Powers of the EP.

For example, vis-a-vis the distribution of power among the organs of the EC, there are important differences of opinion as to what the share of the Parliament should be in the Council's decision-making process. While in general the CAG seems to regard the unanimity rule in the Council as a guarantee that the input of the individual national parliaments into their own governmental decisions will be respected, some PCI members are inclined to such sweeping statements in the opposite sense as that made in December, 1974, by Fazio Fabbrini:

For us Communists, as I have already said many times and wish to repeat today, any act which is designed to transfer to Parliament powers previously held by the Council is a positive one.⁴

4. Fabbrini, Debates, 10 December, 1974, p. 67.

Gustave Ansart, head of the PCF delegation, on the other hand held that it was the power of the member governments in the Council with its unanimity rule which prevented the rise of a bad, new Europe.

. . . a Europe of clans and divisions and of the powerful imposing their will.⁵

The above is a good example of differences between the PCF and the PCI on basic institutional matters, a difference which is perhaps even more clearly illustrated in their opposing viewpoints on the question of direct elections for EP members. The Italian position seems to waver between that originally formulated in 1969, to wit: that no transfer of effective power to the Parliament should take place until direct elections had been agreed upon, and a more general immediate down-grading of the Council's authority in favor of the Parliament.

The PCI journal Rinascita summed up this dilemma as follows:

. . . any transfer of competence from the national to the Community level, unaccompanied by a redistribution of powers within the Community itself, is translated into a reenforcement of the Council and a reduction of the possibility of democratic control [on national or Community level].⁶

The French, on the other hand, standing as they do in opposition to direct elections for the EP, see the sole

5. Ansart, Debates, 11 December, 1974, p. 155.

6. "Sempre nulli i poteri del PE," Rinascita, October 12, 1973, p. 14.

means of preservation of the French workingman's rights in the maintenance of the unanimity rule of the Council.

At that same December, 1974, session, F. P. D'Angelosante even recommended that the unanimity rule be waived, for the first time, in connection with a regulation on the maintenance of competition, on which the EP had given a favorable opinion, but which the Italian representative on the Council was vetoing.⁷ Again, it is interesting to see how an essentially domestic problem has determined the CAG attitude toward an EC institutional arrangement. Had D'Angelosante achieved his goal of in effect overriding the Italian veto in the Council in this case, this would have been a good example of a transfer of the opposition function from the national parliament to the EP.

However, at the October, 1974, session of the Parliament, Amendola had already made it quite clear that the PCI was utterly opposed to giving greater powers to the Council of Ministers, a body "...which is not the expression of a Parliament and a democratic community."⁸ Fabbrini took the matter one step further, warning against the Parliament's wooing of the Council, in the hope of thereby "...managing to wrest a little more from it." Instead the EP should come into conflict with the Council, if it is ever to fulfill its

7. D'Angelosante, Debates, 12 December, 1974, p. 223.

8. Amendola, Debates, 16 October, 1974, p. 145.

function and gain greater esteem and legitimacy among the general public of the EC nations.⁹

2. Budgetary powers.

Between 1970 and 1975, a procedure was developed, according to the so-called "Luxembourg Agreements," for the budgeting and appropriation of funds from the EC's own resources, such as proceeds from the Common External Tariff and a percentage of the community-wide Tax on Value Added, as distinct from funds which have been contributed by the member states in proportion to their size, GNP, and other measurement factors. This procedure permits a far wider parliamentary participation in the decision-making process in this field. The details of this participation are not of direct concern to this study.¹⁰ Suffice to say, the EP's powers with respect to the budget are confined to expenditures for administrative matters (non-obligatory expenditures); its role with respect to the approval of other (obligatory) expenditures, which represent the overwhelming bulk of the EC budget, remains an advisory one. The 1975 treaty on budgetary powers, signed on July 22, also established a Court of Auditors to review all EC expenditures and to report thereon to the Parliament, Commission, and Council. On the

9. Fabbrini, Debates, 12 November, 1974, pp. 50-51.

10. Coombes, op. cit. gives a detailed analysis of the development of parliamentary budgetary powers.

basis of this report, the EP and the Council jointly give discharge to the Commission with respect to the implementation of the budget.¹¹ Thus it can be seen that the EP's "power of the purse" is still largely ex post facto.

Over the years, the debates on the EP's budgetary powers have provided occasions for the statement of CAG policy and illustrations of the differences which exist among the communist parties in the Parliament. As early as 1969 the PCI strongly favored a proposed requirement that the Community budget be submitted in its entirety to the Parliament for approval or rejection, and not merely for suggested changes. This stand was based on the principle that since the funds involved

. . . have been taken out from under national parliamentary control, they require a control on the part of an organ which represents popular sovereignty, even if in mediated form.¹²

The PCI spokeswoman further went on to say that the party was

. . . favorable to any initiative designed to extend the power of control of the Parliament over the actions of the Community.

In fact, the PCI in February, 1970, made the requirement for EP approval of "own resources" expenditures a prerequisite of the PCI vote in favor of the draft agreement, and the party's

11. European Communities, European Parliament Working Documents, 1974-1975, Document 501/74, February 18, 1975, gives text of treaty amendments.

12. Iotti, Débats, 7 octobre, 1969, p. 49.

ultimate support for the treaty amendments incorporating the Luxembourg agreements, when they finally came before the Italian Parliament for ratification.¹³

In December, 1972, the Parliament considered a motion for censure against the Commission for having been dilatory in preparing the necessary legislation to cover the increase in EP budgetary powers which had been authorized by the Luxembourg agreements. The PCI members made clear their disappointment when this motion was withdrawn by its originator, the French socialist Georges Spénale (who in 1975 became President of the Parliament).¹⁴

The debate on budgetary powers provided another opportunity to illustrate the PCI-PCF differences in approach to the institutional question. While Fazio Fabbrini in October, 1973, insisted that a good part of the powers attributed to the Council be transferred to the EP and that

. . . no power of the national parliaments be transferred to community institutions--neither to the EP, nor much less to the Council--until a serious process of democratization of Community life and a profound change in direction of economic and social policy have taken place.¹⁵

the PCI appeared to be prepared to go along with the proposed budgetary consultation procedure (concertation) being established between Council and Parliament, provided that on the

13. Leonardi, Débats, 3 février, 1970, p. 82.

14. Fabbrini, Débats, 12 décembre, 1972, pp. 58-59.

15. Fabbrini, Debates, 4 October, 1973, p. 36.

material covered the EP have "the last word."¹⁶

The PCF, on the other hand, disagreed with this position sharply, as was indicated by Ansart's intervention in which the French Politburo member said

We have not defended for decades our national independence merely to sacrifice it today (!).

French policy, Ansart said, would be decided in France and "nowhere else."¹⁷

3. Ratification.

In one other functional area, the PCI was quick to seize upon an apparent legal lacuna to insist on increased EP powers. D'Angelosante in June, 1969, demanded that the association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco be ratified by the EP, since they had been negotiated and signed by the Community as an international personality, with no provision for ratification by the separate national parliaments. EP ratification was required in order to avoid a situation of "absolute illegitimacy."¹⁸ On another occasion PCI sympathizer, Tullia Carettoni-Romagnoli, pointed out that in the area of trade agreements, negotiated by the Commission and signed by the Council, the national parliaments--at least those which have a ratification provision for such agreements in

16. Ibid., p. 37.

17. Ansart, Debates, 4 July, 1973, p. 111.

18. D'Angelosante, Débats, 3 juin, 1969. p. 38.

their constitutions--are once more deprived of sovereign rights, since there is no procedure for the ratification of trade agreements on the part of the EP as an alternative.¹⁹

The Danish position on budgetary powers follows the delegation's position on the whole question of the role of the EP, and indeed of the legitimacy of the EC itself. The successive Danish delegates have made it abundantly clear that their suspicions of the entire EC establishment can be allayed only if--and possibly not even then--the power of decision remains firmly in the Council of Ministers, where the Danish Folketing has a much greater leverage than it does through its ten members in the European Parliament.²⁰ In fact, on February 1, 1973, the Danish government approved an order spelling out ministerial responsibility for actions taken by Danish representatives in the Council of Ministers, thereby increasing the influence of the Folketing over their actions.²¹

19. Carettoni-Romagnoli, Debates, 13 February, 1973, pp. 75-76.

20. Per Dich, Debates, 4 October, 1973, pp. 43-45.

21. Ibid., p. 44. Dich is referring here to the Markradsudvalget, a committee of the Folketing which instructs the Danish representative of the Council and to which he must report. A similar scrutiny committee has now been established in the British House of Commons which can hold up Council action indefinitely by preventing instructions from reaching the UK delegates on the Council (Author's interview with David Coombes, June 4, 1976).

4. Direct Elections of EP Members.

It is in the field of direct elections of EP members that the division among the CAG members are most clearly illustrated and the primacy of domestic considerations most clearly shown. On January 14, 1975, a general debate was held on the Parliament's latest resolution on direct elections, based on the so-called Patijn report.

The CAG speakers were all critical of the Patijn report; and all abstained in the final vote on the resolution, with the exception of the Danish member of the group, Jens Maigaard, who voted against it. The criticism, however, sprang from quite different sources. Essentially, the PCI held that the resolution did not go far enough (no proportional representation), while the PCF found that it already had gone too far. Maigaard's vote was motivated by the opposition of the present Danish government, an opposition which Maigaard's party supports, to direct elections for EP members in any form, and not by a substantive criticism of the resolution and report.²²

The PCI position, as stated by D'Angelosante, was that direct elections are an important step in the democratization of the European Community, and that these elections

22. Maigaard told the author on June 16, 1976, that he (and the Danish government) opposed not only direct elections, but also any strengthening of the powers of the EP, since this would undermine the Folketing influence through the Council of Ministers.

should be on the basis of proportional representation. This element was missing from the Patijn report. Furthermore the resolution did not provide for the uniform electoral procedure required by the Treaty of Rome. On the contrary, the resolution leaves to each national state the electoral system to be used and therefore the decision as to which of the national parties may participate in the elections in each state.²³

According to the PCF spokesman, Gérard Bordu, the proposed direct elections are a smokescreen for "the handful of giants...[who] are deciding the fate of 250 million Europeans."²⁴ Furthermore, the sham of direct elections is an attempt to "abolish inalienable characteristics." As long as Europe is the lackey of big business, who can predict what the policy of a directly elected Parliament will be? As though with the rising cadences of the Marseillaise, Bordu exclaimed:

... we cannot accept that a European parliamentary majority...should take France's decision for her!²⁵

The PCI's complete disagreement with the French viewpoint was expressed by Iotti as follows:

23. D'Angelosante, Debates, 14 January, 1975, pp. 53-55.

24. Bordu, Debates, 14 January, 1975, pp. 64-65.

25. Bordu, loc. cit. The implication that direct elections would constitute a sham legitimatization was reechoed in the author's confidential conversations in Strasbourg, June, 1975.

. . . we Italian communists are more optimistic in that we have always felt that direct elections would initiate a process which would enable Europe to overcome a large number of obstacles.²⁶

The position of the various elements in the CAG on the question of direct elections reflects a realistic assessment of the electoral possibilities of each. In the case of the PCI, its popular vote has increased steadily over the past decades in every general election since 1948. This trend has been confirmed as recently as the legislative elections of June, 1976. Because of the lowering of the electoral age to eighteen for nearly all purposes, a tendency of more than one half of the new voters entering the electorate to vote for the communist or socialist parties, and the traditional immobilism of the Italian electorate, it is quite likely that an irreversible trend has been set in motion. As older traditionally conservative voting cohorts die off, a continuously increasing communist vote in Italy would appear inevitable, barring unforeseen external factors.²⁷

The PCI thus has nothing to lose from a commitment to direct elections in terms of the future composition of the Italian delegation to the EP. Moreover, the PCI gains in credibility at home through its vigorous espousal of

26. Iotti, Debates, 19 February, 1975, p. 176.

27. Giacomo Sani, "Secular Trends and Party Realignment in Italy: the 1975 Election" (Paper presented at the 1975 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Sept. 2-5, 1975).

democratization and parliamentarianism which its direct elections stance represents, and thereby becomes an ever more respectable partner for an eventual compromesso storico with the DC.²⁸

At the present time, the PCF could benefit from direct elections to the EP only if proportional representation were introduced into the French electoral system at the same time. Any such change to a scrutin de liste system, in the absence of a general constitutional upheaval, seems most unlikely. If, however, the PCF still regards as viable their programme commun with the PS and the left-wing Radicals, then this means that the communists could come to a power-sharing position through the front's winning the presidency rather than a majority in the National Assembly. The margin of the Giscard victory in the presidential elections of 1974 was so close (50.66-49.33) that this road may still seem to be the most fruitful. Given the general philosophy and atmosphere of the Vth Republic's constitution, with its strong presidential leadership, the PCF may therefore in the long run not be interested in a more powerful EP which might be able to frustrate the policy of their elected presidential candidate.

The Danish position is even more negative, since in view of the Danish government's own unfavorable attitude

28. Cf: Gianfranco Pasquino, "Pesi internazionali e contrappesi nazionali," in Il Caso Italiano, ed. by Fabio Luca Cavazza and Stephen R. Graubard (Milan: Garzanti, 1974), Vol. I, p. 166.

toward direct elections, the SFP, which claims to represent all those Danes who voted against joining the EC in the 1972 referendum, must reject out of hand any proposal for such an innovation.²⁹

A recent Eurobaromètre poll (October, 1975) shows sentiment toward direct elections in the countries concerned which tends to substantiate the conclusion that the attitudes of the elements of the CAG are founded chiefly on internal considerations. Respondents of all parties in Italy favored direct elections by 78 percent, the highest percentage in any of the nine member states. This represented an increase of fourteen percentage points over the response in 1973. In France a favorable response came from 69 percent of those polled, an increase of 18 percentage points, while in Denmark the favorable response showed a decline of four points to 32 percent. For all nine countries the response was 64 percent in favor ("completely favor" responses plus "favor on the whole"), an increase of ten percentage points since September, 1973.³⁰

The hypothesis that the PCF's opposition to direct elections is not based on consideration of the sentiment of its own voters on this question, but rather on questions of

29. SFs politik efter den anden oktober. Resolution of the Party Board, October 28/29, 1972.

30. Commission of the European Communities, Eurobaromètre, No. 4, Dec., 1975 (Working Document of the Commission of the European Communities).

internal political strategy, is supported by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique's findings for 1972. These showed that 54 percent of the PCF voters polled favored direct elections to the EP, a higher percentage than for any other political grouping.³¹ In 1973, however, this sentiment had decreased to 48 percent.³² In an index of supranationality based on the 1972 responses to this question and a series of other substantive questions the PCF was shown to be only 44 percent partisan of supranationality, as contrasted with 56 percent for the Socialists, 54 percent for the Centre Démocratique, and 46 percent for the UDR.

Furthermore, it would seem that in all nine countries general attitudes toward European unification have hardly any influence on electoral behavior and party preference. This was the conclusion of the Directorate General of Press and Information of the EC Commission in 1972, after extensive surveys of attitudes toward integration and party preferences.³³ At election time other considerations are

31. The 54 percent support for direct elections may reflect a temporary salience of the EP as an issue among PCF identifiers at the time the poll was taken (May, 1969).

32. 1973 European Communities Study raw data, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

33. Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General, Press and Information, Europeans and European Unification: the Results of a Survey Study Conducted in February-March 1970 etc., Brussels, June, 1972, p. 171. (Mimeographed).

more important than European unification or the powers of the European Parliament.³⁴

Substantive Questions. In dealing with substantive questions before the Parliament the CAG has been guided chiefly by domestic considerations of concern to each member party. Matters of overall European concern are largely secondary factors in the evolution of CAG policy. For example, the PCI has in recent years made gains among the traditionally conservative Italian farmers, and the party hopes that this trend will continue. The thrust of PCI policy in agricultural matters is therefore highly nationalistic and, as will be seen, selectively protectionist while rejecting the much of the EC's general agricultural policy. The French communists are far less aggressive on this point, despite their overall more nationalistic stance, since the EC agricultural policy has until now been largely beneficial to the French farmer.

As a further example of this phenomenon in social matters, the CAG has called for a greater role for the trade unions, since in both Italy and France the communist parties play a dominant role in the principal trade union organizations. Migrant workers, for example, are a concern to the PCI because Italians living abroad are still voters and often become PCI supporters once they have left their traditionally conservative home communities. Since many

34. See Appendix I.

fewer Frenchmen work abroad, and migrant workers in France do not vote unless they become naturalized, the PCF's concern for their fate is more altruistic and correspondingly less intense.

1. Agriculture.

The CAG's policy toward EC efforts to rationalize Community agriculture seems to be essentially protectionist and to be strongly favorable to the interests of the smaller agricultural producers. The PCI fights a continuous and apparently rearguard action in defense of Italian fruit, vegetable, and tobacco growers, attempting to preserve their competitive position and to protect them from politically more influential middlemen. A particular point of attack has been the PCI's offensive against an asserted preferential treatment on the part of the Community for North European products such as butter and cheese, and a discrimination against Southern products such as olive oil. Also, the CAG speakers have attacked the general EC tendency to support high prices for agricultural products, even if this means the destruction of surpluses. They attribute the high prices in part to the chaotic nature of agricultural regulation in the community, which reflects a balance of power among agricultural producers, united in a roof-organization called COPA (Confédération d'Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles), rather than a rational well thought-out plan.

In the fruit and vegetable line, CAG urges that the EC assist the small producers and avoid favoring the middle-man. This favoritism, they claim, was one of the reasons for the Norwegian "no" vote in that country's 1972 referendum on EC membership.³⁵ A remarkable case in this category was the PCI's successful efforts to improve the EC retraining program for Italian tobacco growers who were rendered redundant by the EC's program of free trade in tobacco.³⁶

It is in asserting that discrimination prevails in EC agricultural policy that PCI speakers have been most prominent in their criticism. They claim that EC policy favors the Dutch and other north European producers of butter, while discriminating against Italian olive oil producers. The EC protectionist policy for butter has led to the development of a massive surplus of this product, the so-called "butter mountain," while the free import of vegetable oils is ruinous for the unprotected Sicilian olive growers. This debate was led by the PCI expert on agriculture, Senator Nicola Cipolla; and the fact that his principal adversary,

35. This is doubtful. A new study, edited by Nils Ørvik, Norway's No to Europe (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association Occasional Paper No. 5, 1975, p. 10), found that non-economic values were more important in determining the voter's choice, including the farmer's vote.

36. Leich, op. cit., pp. 277-278.

EC Agricultural Commissioner P. J. Lardenois, is a former Dutch Minister of Agriculture added a certain piquancy to the debate, even if it did not contribute much to the clarification of the issues. Nor has EC policy been much influenced by the PCI's arguments; the "butter mountain" continues to be a major EC agricultural surplus problem to date, and olive oil remains unprotected.³⁷

The PCI position on EC agricultural policy was set forth most comprehensively in the report by Cipolla and Luigi Conte to the meeting on the Italian communists and Europe, held in Rome in November, 1974.³⁸ The main points of this article have since then been reiterated by PCI spokesmen in EC agricultural policy discussions in the EP. According to Cipolla and Conte, the EC's agricultural policy is chaotic, uneconomic and discriminatory, "...a disorderly and casual mosaic of regulations."³⁹ The result of this policy has been high prices for everyone--many times higher than on the international market--which has been a particularly severe blow for the Italian peasant. Neither he nor the crops he produces has benefitted from the EC protectionist policy,

37. Cipolla, Debates, 18 January, 1973, pp. 124-125; 16 January, 1975, pp. 203-204; 30 April, 1975, pp. 101-105, 122-123.

38. N. Cipolla and L. Conte, "La Crisi della politica agricola del MEC" (fn. 36, p. 59).

39. Ibid., p. 56.

and his income has not kept up with that of the industrial workers. The continuing exodus of farm workers to the cities is proof of their dissatisfaction and difficult economic position. Furthermore, the foreign agricultural policy of the EC, especially the practice of dumping Community protected products, has disturbed the world market and unfavorably affected the Third World.

Community agricultural policy, the PCI maintains, tends to harm those branches of agricultural production which employ more workers. On the other hand it favors the bigger and more developed agricultural enterprises, resulting in vast surpluses like the "butter mountain" which must be dumped abroad. At the same time, the association agreements the EC has signed with Third World countries facilitate the import of agricultural products such as olives and citrus fruits which compete with those produced by the poorest EC farmers. All this has resulted in an overall boost for Dutch and French agriculture and a negative balance for the Italian producers. Italy's unfavorable position in this respect is the result of

. . . political and technical weaknesses of the Italian government...aggravated by the prolonged sectarian refusal to allow the participation of the...PSI and PCI
...in Community institutions.⁴⁰

As a solution to this problem the PCI proposes to shift the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund

40. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

to give greater emphasis to its role as a guide in preference to its role as a guarantor, by:

1. abolishing protectionism in grain, sugar beets, and dairy products, and redirecting the EAGGF funds that would otherwise go to export subsidies and the purchase of surpluses in these areas toward financing retraining and large scale developmental projects;

2. using the "own resources" funds in projects which directly improve the income of the small farmers;

3. rationalizing community farm prices so that they will be more in line with world prices, through structural reforms; and

4. leaving the implementation of these structural reforms to the national and even to regional authorities, who are better placed to judge the value and efficiency of such changes than are the central offices of the EAGGF in Brussels.⁴¹

Since the French farmer, at least until the beginning of the fuel crisis in the fall of 1973, has been in a much more favorable position vis-a-vis the EC than has the Italian, the PCF has been much less concerned with EC agricultural policy than has the PCI. Traditionally, the PCF has been far more a movement of the French urban proletariat, with few roots in the countryside, in sharp contrast to the present composition of the PCI, about a third of whose membership is of rural origin.

The agricultural price crisis which developed in the fall of 1974, with demonstrations in France and Italy and shortages, especially of sugar, in many parts of the Nine led the French Communist Party to support the PCI's demand for

41. Ibid., pp. 69-71.

a redefinition and revision of the Community's agricultural policy. However, the PCF insisted that any such redefinition should give a wide freedom of application to each of the member states, since the farmers were even now asking for "a closure of the frontiers."⁴² Ansart saw the key to the solution in an initiative on the part of the CAG to call for a special session of the EP. This session was convened on September 16. Before this time the PCF had shown little interest in agricultural problems, but at this session the PCF supported "solidarity between workers in town and country." At the same time there was

. . . no need to do away with national independence and sovereignty in order to organize cooperation, European security, and defend the vital interests of the workers.⁴³

The CAG is also well aware of the usefulness of the EC relationship for politicking at the local level. The depressed mountain areas of Northern Italy have shown an increasing trend toward PCI voting preferences.⁴⁴ In 1973, a PCI spokesman called for a "vast assistance program" from the European Social Fund for this area, presumably as a reward for the support of the share-croppers and poor farmers of the Red Belt in northern Italy. Traditionally, most ESF funds have

42. Ansart, Debates, 16 September, 1974, p. 39.

43. Ibid., p. 40.

44. Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 338-339.

been spent in the South.⁴⁵ As of June, 1975, EC assistance for Red Belt farmers had not yet materialized.

2. Economic Organization of the Community.

The CAG's view of the overall economy of the EC is a complex one. The PCI regards the EC as "an incomplete customs union, with certain elements which are characteristic of an economic union."⁴⁶ The Community, they say, is guided by the ideology of free exchange, and tends to favor the existing private forms of economic organization, specifically the multinational corporations. Further there are growing gaps (difformità), first between the EC and the USA, and secondly within the Community itself between the developed and underdeveloped sectors. Italy belongs in the latter. These gaps have been widened by the investment policies of the largely American multinational corporations. To the extent that economic integration is achieved, external control is weakened. An increase in European productivity will be incompatible with hegemonic control from outside the EC. Therefore, it is up to the CAG to work for greater integration in order to overcome the unevenness of contemporary economic development.

Until now, the PCI maintains the reasons for the failure of the European economic union have been the lack of

45. Luigi Marras, Debates, 10 May, 1973, p. 220.

46. Leonardi, "Il Processo di Integrazione," p. 73.

a democratic consensus and the lack of a capacity for autonomy vis-a-vis external forces.⁴⁷ However, the PCI's remedy in the past for this failure has been a more active intervention of the workers "as the most dynamic and progressive of the productive forces."⁴⁸ The PCF, on the other hand tends rather to attribute European economic problems to a general crisis of the capitalist system. Minor institutional reforms will not suffice. The multinationals must be checked and the EC democratized "in all fields and in all its organs."⁴⁹ These two approaches were illustrated in the contributions of Leonardi (PCI) and Marcel Lemoine (PCF) during the EP debate on inflation in October, 1973. Leonardi opposed the proposed community anti-inflationary measures both on substantive grounds and on the more theoretical ground that the measures gave greater power to the "non-democratic" institutions of the Community.. At the same time appeared to favor a return to protectionism, in which the weaker economies will suffer the most.⁵⁰ Lemoine, on the other hand, held that inflation is the result of the strengthening of capitalistic monopolies.

. . . the poisoned fruit of the hyperaccumulation of capital, the endemic disease--one could most say the

47. I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo, 1974/3, resumé of November, 1974, session, p. 3.

48. Leonardi, "Il Processo di Integrazione," p. 54.

49. I Comunisti al Parlamento europeo, loc. cit.

50. Leonardi, Debates, 16 October, 1973, p. 38.

leukemia--of the capitalist economy.⁵¹

Victory in the fight against inflation is to be found not in further supranationalism, but in the restoration of national sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and international cooperation.

3. Social Policy and Labor Policy.

Under the heading of social policy, the CAG has taken up the questions of working conditions throughout the EC, unemployment, inflation, the status of migrant workers in the Community countries, and the role of the trade unions in the development of the Community policy. It is this last item that often seems to be the major social concern of the CAG, insofar as what is disclosed through emphasis in public debates. Even before 1969 the communist parties were pushing for greater participation by trade unions in Community policy development. As the economic situation grew worse in 1972 and 1973, this demand was intensified.

The position was first spelled out in the EP in Iotti's speech in June, 1970, in which she said that the trade unions must play a direct role in Community life, establishing

. . . a dialectical relationship which, without detracting from the political organs, will give European democracy an ever less delegated character,

and that furthermore "a greater participation of the popular

51. Lemoine, Ibid., p. 44.

masses in the construction of Community social policy" was required.⁵²

As a CAG initiative, and after some hesitations on the part of the participants, a tri-partite meeting on the unemployment crisis was held at the end of 1974 in Brussels, among ministers of labor and/or social affairs of the Nine, the EC Commission, and representatives of the national trade union federations, including the French pro-communist CGT and the newly organized Italian combined communist-social democratic-Christian democratic trade union association. It is interesting to note that there was very little difference between these two groups as far as the future role and demands of the European trade unions were concerned.

At this Brussels meeting, the trade unions called for "precise reconversion plans, elaborated with the participation and supervision (contrôle) of the trade unions," and a new investment policy for the European Social Fund, to be developed in concordance with the trade union organizations. The trade union memorandum asked that these proposals be accepted as a "serious basis for negotiation." In general the trade unions have been continuously critical of the small amounts allotted to the ESF (less than one billion units of account [1971 dollars] over a three year period), as well as the lack of consultation in its allocation and expenditures.

52. Iotti, Débats, 16 juin, 1970, p. 72.

This critical stance has been reflected in CAG parliamentary interventions.⁵³ The tri-partite meeting was considered a sufficiently useful forum for social action to be reconvened late in 1975.

The CAG has had to continue to press for the 40-hour week, with no overtime and earlier retirement, throughout the Community, despite their wry admission that the 40-hour week has been a trade union goal ever since the beginning of this century. By 1974, the 40-hour week was EC policy, on paper, at least, for which the CAG has claimed the credit because of its efforts in the EP and elsewhere.⁵⁴

The migrant workers in EC countries have received considerable attention for many reasons. One is the large number of these workers, especially in Germany and the low countries, who are Italian, and return to Italy to vote at every important election, mostly at public expense. Another reason is that France is host to migrant workers from several Mediterranean countries. As to the Communist parties' position on this problem, the PCI and the PCF hardly differ. The CAG therefore called for giving the migrant worker the same social, cultural, and political rights as each country's own nationals, regardless of whether he plans to stay abroad

53. "Per una Politica Sociale Europea (Documentazione)" I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo, 1974/3, pp. 17-26.

54. Luigi Marras, Debates, 10 December, 1973, p. 27

or not.⁵⁵ CAG stressed the vulnerability of the migrant worker to any decline in the economy, since he, as the worker with the least organized defense, will be the first to be laid off. Ultimately, however, the CAG maintains that it is the multinational corporations who are to blame for the migrant worker's plight, since it is they who have created his employment.⁵⁶

4. Multinational Corporations.

It is not surprising that the multinational corporations appear as a major source of distress in the CAG European scenario. They are blamed for polluting the environment,⁵⁷ for stifling competition,⁵⁸ for contributing too little to the EC's treasury,⁵⁹ for creating regional imbalances in Europe,⁶⁰ and for causing unemployment and inflation.⁶¹ In approaching the question of the investment by

55. Lemoine, Debates, 12 February, 1974, pp. 59-60; D'Angelosante, Debates, 12 June, 1974, pp. 106-108.

56. Marras, Debates, 12 March, 1973, (not reproduced in English text of record. A photocopy of Marras' speech, taken from the Italian version of the record is reproduced on page 86 of I Comunisti al parlamento, interventi...dal novembre 1972 al dicembre 1973. Luxembourg: CAG, 1974/?).

57. D'Angelosante, Debates, 3 July, 1973, p. 72.

58. Leonardi, Debates, 15 January, 1974, pp. 35-37.

59. Fabbrini and Lemoine, Debates, 14 March, 1974, pp. 121-122, 124-125.

60. Marie-Thérèse Goutmann (PCF), Debates, 9 December, 1974, pp. 38-39.

61. See Above.

American multinationals in the EC, the CAG appears to follow the now standard neo-Leninist analysis, to wit: that surplus capital from a highly industrialized state seeks an outlet in a less developed area, albeit in the case of Europe an area which has already been industrialized. This investment has both stimulated the competitiveness of the European economies among themselves and improved the competitive position of the American enterprises. The EC reaction has therefore been ambiguous, an effort to save the advantages of American investment while protecting the European economy from American domination. Meanwhile the technological gap continues to grow to the advantage of the American multinationals, and control at the national or EC level becomes more and more difficult.⁶²

The PCI position on multinationals is that they are not per se either good or bad. After all, there are multinational economic enterprises even in the socialist countries; and there are mixed forms of multinational undertakings between private companies and socialist countries, such as the Fiat works in Togliattigrad, USSR. The multinationals

. . . correspond to an objective need for the internationalization of productive activities through specialization at the level of production, and not only at the level of trade in finished products according to the

62. Giovanni Duchini e Carlo Ruggeri, "La CEE e gli Stati europei di fronte alle 'corporations' USA," Rinascita, 1 febbraio 1974, pp. 21-22.

traditional principles of international trade.⁶³

The basic task is to adapt EC institutions to cope with the problem of control and to create a capacity for political decision making at the international level.

The PCF position starts from the same theoretical premises, but comes to somewhat different and ultimately illogical conclusions. Multinational enterprises represent

. . . the answer of the large capitalist groupings to the objective need for exchange of information, work, and goods among nations.⁶⁴

However, apparently simply because of their size, the multinationals are potentially, if not actually evil. The turnover of General Motors is greater than the Swiss or Belgian GNP, while multinationals shamefacedly exploited the workers in Portugal and Chile before the revolutions in these countries forced them to treble the workers' wages. The interpenetration of big business and government in the EC nations renders nugatory any attempt at national control of the multinationals. Therefore, the PCF sees nationalization of these corporations as the only solution. During the debate in which this problem was raised in December, 1974, EC Commissioner Altiero Spinelli was quick to point out that Bordu's proposal for nationalization was not at all responsive to his theoretical premise that the contemporary economy is

63. Leonardi, Debates, 12 December, 1974, p. 221. Cf. Klaus, op cit., pp. 97-115.

64. Bordu, Debates, 12 December, 1974, p. 218.

breaking out of national frontiers, regardless of whether it follows the capitalist or socialist mode of production.⁶⁵

The EC's attempt to cope with the multinational corporation problem through the establishment of a European Company Statute met with a mixed reaction from the CAG. The Statute, proposed by the Commission to the Council of Ministers on May 13, 1975,⁶⁶ attempts both to facilitate the formation of corporations operating simultaneously in two legal systems and to provide a means for their control. In addition to the granting of an international charter, the Statute also provides for a Supervisory Board, with worker participation, and a European Works Council for each enterprise. The CAG was placed in a rather difficult position when debate on the Commission's proposal began in July, 1974.

While the CAG was strongly opposed to the philosophy behind the European Company Statute which was in part designed to facilitate the establishment of multinational corporations in Europe, they felt they must strongly support the provisions for workers' representation in the Supervisory Council and in the European Works' Council. The CAG therefore pressed for greater authority for these bodies, a more simplified and direct form of election, especially for workers' representatives, but at the same time a restriction on any right of the

65. Spinelli, Debates, 12 December, 1974, p. 225.

66. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/75.

European Works' Council to bargain collectively on behalf of any national trade union group. This last was in the interest of maintaining the principle of "class autonomy."⁶⁷

The CAG has also maintained that the existence of the European Company Statute did not preclude the individual countries from continuing their efforts to control the multinational corporations through legislation or court action. Thus, even though the European Company Statute will probably become a part of the legal system of the Nine, its existence will not represent a relinquishment of sovereignty to the Commission and the European Court in this connection. It should be noted that this position may be in conflict with the CAG's general stand on sovereignty, first formulated by Iotti in 1971, which has upheld the supremacy of community over national law, as far as the establishment of the common market in various products was concerned.⁶⁸ The subsequent reservation of the right to exercise national control over multinational organizations should therefore be regarded as yet another example of the privacy of domestic over Community considerations, at least as far as the PCI is concerned.

67. D'Angelosante, Debates, 10 July, 1974, pp. 149-53, 198-99, 206; Marras, Ibid., p. 197.

68. Iotti, "Sovranità Nazionale," p. 82.

5. Attitude toward NATO.

The PCI position with respect to NATO has become increasingly clear, especially since 1969, and since the development of the compromesso storico and the very real possibility of the PCI's at least sharing power in a future Italian government. As was discussed above,⁶⁹ the PCI had originally opposed the creation of the EEC, because it was a product of the cold war and the offspring of NATO. By 1969, however, all that was changed, and Amendola could declare:

And now the Community has finished with being involved in the crisis of NATO and the Atlantic policy.

In other words, the original sin had been overcome, even though it is not clear exactly how or why. In place of Luigi Longo's slogan at the XIIth PCI Congress in February, 1969, of "Italy out of NATO and NATO out of Italy!" Amendola substituted the concept of the superamento dei blocchi (transcending military blocs), to which he referred in his maiden speech to the EP on March 12, 1969. Such a transcending would be

. . . pursued by means of reciprocal agreements providing for the liquidation [of the blocs] by successive states, passing from the creation of atom-free or demilitarized zones to the creation of vast neutral regions.⁷⁰

69. Page 54.

70. Amendola, Debats, 12 mars, 1969, p. 38. (Così la Comunità ha finito con l'essere coinvolta nella crisi della politica atlantica e della NATO).

However, by 1974, the PCI was no longer insisting on a dissolution of the military blocs as a prerequisite of détente. Berlinguer, in his report to the Central Committee, held that such a dissolution would not be one of the

. . . final consequences, and presumably not an early one, of the progress of détente... It is not realistic to contemplate an eventual unilateral withdrawal of individual countries [including Italy] from either of the [military] pacts.⁷¹

By the time the XIVth PCI Congress had arrived, Berlinguer had reached a position of even opposing Italy's withdrawal from the North Atlantic pact. In his report to the Congress of March 18, 1975, he said:

We are not raising the question of Italy's withdrawal from the Atlantic Pact, since neither this eventuality nor any other unilateral withdrawal from either bloc is feasible, and would indeed end up by hindering or even reversing the process of international détente...⁷²

Berlinguer clearly regarded a potential withdrawal from NATO as a destabilizing factor on the international scene, and therefore a threat to a further development of détente. Finally, while the matter of Italy's membership in NATO was not discussed on the floor of the EP in recent years, the attitude of the PCI delegation can be seen clearly from a recent interview of Amendola by Der Spiegel, in which the CAG Chairman said, in response to a question whether a PCI

71. Enrico Berlinguer, La Proposta Comunista (Torino: Einaudi, 1975), pp. 38-39.

72. L'Unità, March 24, 1975, p. 8.

government would declare Italy no longer a member,

No, since a withdrawal would seriously (gravierend) disturb the European equilibrium and détente.⁷³

The position of the PCF on this matter is of course quite different, taking as a point of departure present French policy toward NATO. Since General de Gaulle in 1966 withdrew French forces from NATO command, the PCF has seen the problem more in terms of France's re-entry into the organizational structure of NATO than in terms of her withdrawal from the Alliance. While Denis and Kanapa complained in 1969 of the continued existence of any French ties to NATO,⁷⁴ more recent

73. Der Spiegel, August 4, 1975, p. 76. In the June 15 issue of Corriere della Sera, Berlinguer said in a pre-election interview:

I feel that since Italy does not belong to the Warsaw Pact, from this viewpoint there is an absolute certainty that we can proceed along the Italian way to socialism without any interference [on the part of the USSR]...

In reply to a question whether the North Atlantic Treaty were not a shield for the construction of socialism in freedom, Berlinguer said:

I want Italy not to leave NATO also for this reason, and not only because our exit would upset the international equilibrium. I feel safer on this side...

These words, which ultimately arose from a comparison between the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Italy today, may mark a turning point in the development of "eurocommunism" as a third type of Marxism-Leninism, alongside those of the Soviets and the Chinese.

74. Denis et Kanapa, op. cit., pp. 103-120.

commentaries have expressed a PCF fear that the post-de Gaulle leadership wishes to re-involve France with NATO as an alternative to the continuation of the force de frappe.⁷⁵ The Communist-Socialist Programme Commun calls quite clearly for the immediate and simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw and the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations, as well as a renunciation of the French independent nuclear deterrent and France's adherence to the Test Ban and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties.⁷⁶ In the EP itself, the PCF has had little to say about NATO as a European phenomenon, other than to decry the idea that Europe might constitute a third force. Such a third force, in the eye of the PCF, could only be a sub-bloc of European capitalists in a system of blocs which the PCF hopes to help Europe to transcend.⁷⁷

6. Energy Policy.

In the field of energy policy, the CAG has followed a line which could be interpreted as pro-Arab, but which seems largely dictated again by domestic considerations. The CAG opposes special concessions to oil producing companies which are exploring supplies of crude oil in Europe and its offshore waters, and opposes the general concept of "independence" in

75. Jean Kanapa, Coexistence Pacifique et Lutte de Classe en 1975 (Paris: Parti Communiste Français, 1975), pp. 39-40.

76. Programme Commun, pp. 171, 174.

77. Ansart, Debates, 16 January, 1974, p. 123.

energy matters as a pretext for cutting down purchases of Mid-Eastern oil for political motives.⁷⁸ However, the CAG maintains that it is the price of fuel that is the critical matter, and that all means possible should be used to expand its production, in order to prevent a further price rise.

At the same time, the CAG is critical of EC policy in channelling some of the efforts of Euratom into non-nuclear research. Such research, it maintains, is merely a backstop to what the petroleum industry should be doing anyway, and is thus an indirect subsidy to the already rich oil multinationals.⁷⁹ The PCF favors the return of supervision of nuclear research to the national governments, so that Europe will not be dependent on American imports of nuclear technology in the future. The program commun calls for the nationalization of the French nuclear industry; and this according to the PCF, would be the safest means of dealing with the problem, both economically and physically.⁸⁰

Coal mine safety is also an important preoccupation of the PCF, which has a high concentration of voters in the mining country in Northeastern France. Accidents in coal mines seem--to the PCF--to increase together with the profits of the mine owners, rather than the reverse.⁸¹

78. Bordu, Debates, 10 April, 1975, pp. 168-170.

79. Leonardi, Ibid., pp. 14-15.

80. Lemoine, Debates, 15 May, 1975, pp. 137-138.

81. Ansart, Ibid., pp. 17-18.

7. Tax on Value Added.

The CAG position on the Tax on Value Added (TVA), one percent of which is supposed to flow directly to the EC for incorporation into its own resources fund, reflects an appreciation of the unpopularity of this new type of tax, particularly in Italy, where it is believed that the application of TVA has contributed sharply to the inflation problem.⁸² During the course of the debate on harmonization of TVA schedules in March, 1974, the CAG's generally negative position was illustrated, again with minor PCI-PCF variations. The PCI held that EC efforts to dictate TVA policy to the members were bound to fail, since TVA was a part of the entire taxation picture of each member state, and therefore should remain the responsibility of the Nine governments, who could administer TVA with due regard for the overall taxation policy of each country.⁸³

The PCF position was more blunt. TVA is unjust in principle, since it is regressive and its burden falls chiefly on the working classes, while giving advantages to the monopolies. The final consumer is penalized while the capitalist processor benefits by being able to pass on the cost to

82. Cf: CESPE, op. cit., pp. 113-121, for a prediction that this would happen. Both wholesale and retail prices rose in Italy by about 15 percent at the beginning of 1974 in anticipation of the introduction of TVA during that year. This was an attempt to offset the fiscal penalization which TVA entails.

83. Fabbrini, Debates, 14 March, 1974, pp. 120-122.

the working man. TVA is thus a system "based on class distinctions."⁸⁴ The Community should rather tackle the problem of the large European multinational industrial and financial groups as a means for satisfying its need for more "own resources" funds.

8. EC Relations with the Third World.

The CAG's attitude toward Community relations with the Third World can be illustrated by recalling the position of the EC communist parties on the original association provisions contained in the Treaty of Rome, then on the two Yaoundé conventions (see below) and finally on the 1975 Lomé Agreement, which sets up a cooperation pattern between the EC and the forty-six African Caribbean and Pacific countries. One of the reasons for the originally negative attitude of the West European communist parties toward the Treaty of Rome may well have been the fact that incorporated into the treaty at that time was an association agreement with the French and Belgian colonies in Africa which were in the process of achieving their independence. This "colonial appendix" to the Treaty was seen as prolonging in practice the colonial relationship of the area with the European "motherlands."⁸⁵

84. Lemoine, Ibid., pp. 124-125.

85. Renato Sandri (CAG member), "L'Europa cerca ossigeno," Rinascita, XXXII, No. 8 (February 21, 1975), pp. 19-20.

Later agreements with the now independent African countries, signed at Yaoundé in 1963 and 1969, were still subjected to heavy criticism as neo-colonialist, especially because they provided for continued preferential treatment for EC products, and gave the African countries little influence over EC decisions on development aid to their economies.⁸⁶ The CAG did concede that there were some improvements in Yaoundé II, in terms of generalized preferences, export subsidies for the associates, and the reduction of the "reverse preferences" for EC exports to Africa.⁸⁷

The attitude of the CAG toward the Lomé Convention of 1975 was now basically positive, the only cavil being over the insufficient leverage given to the associated states in determining the amount of European Development Fund grants to be given for particular purposes.⁸⁸ The CAG attributes the "improvement" in the Lomé Convention to the success of the African liberation movements in the ex-Portuguese colonies and elsewhere, the participation of trade unions in the negotiations, and the development of a consciousness of the fact and significance of independence in the ex-colonial areas, symbolized by the development of OPEC, and African and Caribbean relations with Cuba. Thus a return to the old

86. D'Angelosante, Débats, 9 décembre, 1969, p. 29.

87. Iotti, "Sovranità Nazionale," p. 90.

88. Sandri, Debates, 10 December, 1974, pp. 97-98.

colonial or neocolonial relationship seems to the CAG an unlikely outcome.⁸⁹ Indeed, Renato Sandri has described the Lomé Convention as a "historic event," and has claimed that its multilateral nature is the principal guarantee against a "relapse into [American] neo-colonialism."⁹⁰ The victory of multilateralism in the Lomé Agreement represents a defeat of the United States' ambition to prevent Europe from acting on its own.

9. The EC and East-West trade.

The CAG position on multilateralism in trade with the Third World may be the key to an important evolution in the CAG's attitude toward EC trade relations with socialist or "state-trading" countries, as the communist states are officially designated by the Community. From 1960 to 1971, the PCI position was that the bourgeois parties' objections to bilateral agreements between EC members and individual socialist countries were lacking in validity, and that in particular the claim that such trade should be Community controlled simply because the Soviet Union did not officially recognize the existence of the EC was in effect a red herring. The Community had different sorts of relationships with different parts of the world. Exceptions had been made for

89. Sandri, "L'Europa cerca ossigeno," p. 20.

90. Sandri, Debates, 30 April, 1975, p. 90.

trade with the United States in the Kennedy Round,⁹¹ for the Third World with the association agreements; why not then an exemption in favor of bilateralism for the socialist countries? Community control over trade all too easily could spill over into control over political contacts, to the detriment of such helpful developments as the Brandt Ostpolitik.⁹²

In 1972, this position was still being maintained, but with a slight modification. The Paris EC summit of November of that year had proposed a coordination (concertation) of trade policy by the EC powers in anticipation of the European Security Conference. The PCI spokesman at that time did not oppose concertation in principle, provided the EC had made concrete progress toward democratization and was not slipping back into the position of creating a new trading bloc.⁹³ In the autumn of 1973, in view of an approach by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)⁹⁴ for multi-lateral negotiations between Comecon and the EC, the CAG spokesman held out the possibility that such negotiations might very well lead to an exclusion of bilateral agreements.

91. The Kennedy Round provides for consultation between the EC and the US in the establishment or modification of the EC Common External Tariff. These consultations usually result in important preferences for US exports to the EC.

92. D'Angelosante, Débats, 25 novembre, 1969, p. 46. Cf: CECE, pp. 204-212.

93. Leonardi, Débats, 15 novembre, 1972, p. 143.

94. Comecon may be considered a counterpart to the EC in that it is an organization of the countries of the Soviet bloc, designed to integrate their economies.

but that the latter should not be excluded a priori. In any case, bilateral agreements could not be seriously considered an obstacle to European political union.⁹⁵

In February, 1974, the Commission proposed to the Council that cooperation agreements by EC members with non-member countries, including specifically the state-trading countries, be brought under Community control. During the EP debate on this proposal, the CAG reversed its previous stand; its spokesman strongly endorsed the principle of Community control, as a means of "enabl[ing] Europe to resist American pressure and so defend its own identity."⁹⁶ He cited the Soviet-West German agreement of May, 1973, as proof of the

. . . positive intentions of the socialist countries and of the complete compatibility of interstate cooperation agreements with the assumption of the Community's unitary development.

The CAG voted for the proposal, which was ultimately adopted by the Council of Ministers as EC policy. In February, 1975, however, the CAG had another opportunity to reaffirm its defense of bilateral agreements, as important contributions to détente, in discussing the Parliament's resolution on expanding trade with Comecon. This time the CAG supported the resolution in principle, but abstained in the final vote, apparently because of the resolution's warning that bilateral

95. D'Angelosante, Debates, 18 October, 1973, p. 181.

96. Sandri, Debates, 11 February, 1974, pp. 19-20.

agreements represented a "danger to be avoided."⁹⁷

This rather dramatic shift from an exclusive support for bilateralism to backing for Community control of trade with communist countries is difficult to explain. All one can do is take at face value the CAG assertion that the EC can, through the assumption of such control, "defend its own identity," and relate this decision either to the very slow defrosting trend in Soviet policy toward the EC (noted earlier),⁹⁸ or to the growing divergences between West European CPs and the CPSU. Even the most optimistic view of possible change in the Community's political complexion as a result of the eventual admission of left-wing Mediterranean governments cannot be projected ex post facto to justify such a shift in support for EC institutions. The matter must be left for further investigation.

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97. Sandri, Debates, 18 February, 1975, pp. 106-107. Cf: Goutmann's elaboration of the PCF's position is as follows: "Trade between the EEC and Comecon should not result in national independence and sovereignty being called into question." This may very well reflect a fear that France might be hampered by EC control in her efforts to liberalize trade with the USSR. Ibid., p. 108.
98. Cf: Wolfgang Berner and Heinz Timmermann, Erfahrungsbericht über den Besuch einer Gruppe führender Vertreter der Italienischen Kommunistischen Partei in Bonn und Köln am 15-16 März 1973 (Köln: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1973), p. 12.

Indications of the CAG's policy toward EC relations with China were revealed in two instances during the EP sessions between March, 1969, and June, 1975. In February, 1973, Sandri raised the question of future Community relations with China, and expressed the hope that the rumors were untrue that the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) was now proposing to enter into relations with a Europe which China would find united "both economically and militarily." To give credence to such a Chinese hope could involve the EC in a new cold war situation, which should be avoided at all costs.⁹⁹ In the June session of 1975, when the question of EC-CPR relations was again debated, the entire CAG was absent from the hall during the entire course of Commissioner Sir Christopher Soames' report on his negotiations with the Chinese, and during the period of debate which followed.¹⁰⁰ The diplomatic diffidence expressed in both cases may reflect the strict neutrality of the PCI in the Sino-Soviet conflict, which the PCF has not found cause to overstep. In the fall of 1975 the EC and the CPR reached an agreement establishing diplomatic and commercial relations between them comparable to the EC's formal relations with the US. No other communist country has official relations with the EC.

99. Sandri, Debates, 13 February, 1973, p. 59.

100. Author's personal observation, June 18, 1975.

The Lyrical Function. There is one area of CAG action which has to do with neither institutional nor substantive questions per se which can be described as "lyrical," and is a function shared by the EP with other parliaments and popular assemblies. This is the propensity of such institutions to engage in what are in fact obiter dicta on a rather grand scale, and to turn the European Parliament, for example, into a forum for the expression of European opinion about the dramatic political issues of the day, even when their solution--or discussion--may not fall within the purview or powers of the EP.

The CAG's participation in this "lyrical" role has been well illustrated by its espousing of particular causes, such as the Berufsverbot issue in Germany, whereby persons with left-wing associations are being denied the possibility of employment in government careers.¹⁰¹ Other good examples are Community policy toward the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, and Greece), the problem of continued prosecution for war crimes, the execution of political criminals in Spain, and--perhaps the most lyrical of all--the question of whether to celebrate the end of World War II (to be discussed below).

101. Cf: Kenneth H. F. Dyson, "Anti-Communism in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Case of the Berufsverbot, Parliamentary Affairs, XXVII, No. 1, (Winter, 1974/75), pp. 51-67 passim.

The right of the European Parliament to concern itself with questions of violations of human rights is said to flow from the consideration of safeguarding peace and liberty, expressed in the preambles of the treaties which established the European Communities.¹⁰² It was with this justification that the EP passed resolutions criticizing the coup d'état in Chile (October 17, 1973), the arrest and expulsion from the USSR of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (February 14, 1974), the Spanish government's execution of the Basque separatist leader, Puig Antich (March 14, 1974), and the failure of Bolivia to extradite the Nazi war criminal, Klaus Barbie (October 15, 1974).

It was the CAG which sponsored a resolution on July 11, 1974, deploring the granting of any amnesty to war criminals.¹⁰³ With the full support of the Socialist Group, this resolution was passed without opposition on February 17, 1975, even though some EP members were bothered by the fact that the resolution was communist-sponsored. The resolution on the execution of Puig Antich was also greeted with some misgivings, because the CAG president was one of the resolution's co-sponsors. One has the impression from the record of the debate that some of the EP members were attracted by

102. Franco Concas (PSI), rapporteur, Debates, 17 February, 1975, p. 24.

103. European Parliament, Working Documents 1974-1975. Document 200/74.

the Puig Antich resolution, since it seemed to balance the resolution on the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn which had been adopted during the previous month.¹⁰⁴ In fact, Bordu of the PCF had to go some lengths just to dispel the impression of this type of trade-off. In his contribution to the March 14 debate he stressed that:

We have never approved of the exile of this writer [Solzhenitsyn]. In fact, it was not our business to pass an opinion on the matter because we consider that viewed historically the Soviet Union is still backward in some respects... [However, the USSR] had to carry out certain tasks which have impeded its normal democratic development.¹⁰⁵

Indeed, the lyrical function can carry an EP member a long way! The record does not show how the CAG members voted on this resolution.

The CAG-sponsored resolution which chastized the President of the French Republic for abolishing VE-Day was far less successful. This was defeated in a voice vote, despite a considerable amount of unexpressed sympathy for the CAG position on the part of the French (Gaullist) EPD.¹⁰⁶ Those who spoke against the resolution stressed that this was an internal French matter, regardless of Bordu's assertions that President Giscard d'Estaing had consulted President Ford

104. Jan B. Broeksz (Dutch Socialist), Debates, 14 March, 1974, p. 183.

105. Bordu, Debates, 14 March, 1974, p. 191.

106. Author's interview with Jean Feidt, Chef du Bureau d'Information du PE, Paris, June 6, 1975.

before issuing his proclamation.¹⁰⁷

Written and Oral Question Procedure. The CAG's participation in the work of the Parliament may be judged in part by its share in the written and oral questions raised during parliamentary sessions. Here the CAG's share has been roughly proportional to its representation in the EP (8 percent), during the twelve-month period which ended with the June, 1975, session. Thirteen of the 161 questions raised with either the Council or Commission were CAG initiatives. This rough proportionality raises some question as to the efficacy of the CAG's role as a legitimatizing opposition in the EP. In a study made in 1966, Gerda Zellentin found that the then "opposition" in the EP, the Socialist Group, tended to initiate a lion's share (over 55 percent) of the parliamentary questions.¹⁰⁸ If at the present time we consider the Conservative and Christian-Democratic Groups to constitute an opposition as far as bourgeois political parties are concerned, and the Socialist and Liberal Groups to be the majority,¹⁰⁹ then we find that the same tendency discovered by Zellentin prevails in the year ending with the June, 1975, session, namely: 66 opposition questions to 44 majority

107. Bordu, Debates, 13 May. 1975, p. 30.

108. Zellentin, "Form and Function of the Opposition," p. 433.

109. This majority-opposition dichotomy is, to my mind highly conjectural and based on as yet insufficient data. Cf: Fitzmaurice, op. cit., pp. 193-203, passim.

questions. If the 21 questions raised by the European Progressive Democrats are included in the opposition tally, the preponderance of opposition questions is even more notable. This may be explained, however, by other variables, such as the greater familiarity of the British Conservatives and the Irish EPD members with the question procedure, owing to their experience with the Westminster practice of a special time for oral questions from the floor. This practice was adopted by the EP after the enlargement of the Community in 1972.

Two of the CAG questions raised during this period dealt with an initiative which has been an example of successful CAG intervention in EC activities. On December 12, 1973, the CAG requested that the EC convoke a tripartite conference of trade unions, employers' representatives, and ministers of Labor to draw up a European statute of workers' rights, including those of migrant workers. The statute should cover working hours, retirement age, salaries, social benefits, and non-discrimination against women and younger workers. The continuing energy crisis in the fall of 1974 again prompted the CAG to raise the question of the proposed tripartite conference. Such a conference was in fact held at the end of the year.¹¹⁰ A second CAG question in April, 1975, strongly urged that the Council carry out the recommendation of the December, 1974, meeting to the effect that the conference be re-convened in 1975. This was done on

110. I Comitati al Parlamento Europeo, 1974/3, p. 28.

November 18, 1975.¹¹¹

Of the remaining eleven questions, three dealt with general problems; the energy crisis, the control of poverty and the price and supply of sugar. Three appealed to identifiable constituencies: women, workers in the auto industries, and residents of Brussels near the EC headquarters, and one concerned a specifically Italian problem. The other four can be classified as fulfilling the "lyrical" function of the EP, questions concerning topics of great symbolic importance, the raising of which adds to the prestige of the CAG or of its associates internationally. Such "lyrical" questions dealt with the restrictions on employment for left-wingers in Germany, the location of a vocational training center in West Berlin, the Council's congratulations to the Chilean Junta on the anniversary of its seizure of power (!), and the fate of Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus.

Within-Group Differences and Differentiations.

While the differences among the four parties which compose the CAG should not be exaggerated, it is useful to examine these differences in detail for the light they shed on the policies of each party and on the possibility of the evolution of a common "eurocommunist" policy toward Europe.

111. Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 11, 1975, pp. 11-14.

1. PCF-PCI Differences.

The most important differences within the CAG arise between the PCF and the PCI. Broadly speaking, these differences might be said to reflect the stereotypes, over the years, of Italian and French policy respectively toward European integration. The overall Italian policy, and therefore with the policy of the PCI, can be seen as an effort to maximize the not inconsiderable advantages which Italy can receive from membership in the EC, while the overall French and PCF policy seeks to maximize France's freedom of action within the Community framework.

The PCF's strong emphasis on French freedom of action has only become clear during the course of the presence of its delegation in Strasbourg, i.e. since July, 1973. The 1972 Programme commun du gouvernement, to which the PCF continuously refers as the basis for its policy,¹¹² does not deal with the subject of sovereignty in detail. Instead it issues two broad injunctions with respect to France's role in the EC. The Programme enjoins the democratization of the Community's institutions and the preservation of France's liberty of action.¹¹³ What this latter term means in practice has only recently been clarified.

112. By contrast with the French PS delegates, who never mention it (Author's interview with Jean Feidt, June 6, 1975).

113. Programme commun, p. 177.

In 1973, the PCF approached the question of sovereignty in a low key. In his maiden address, Gustave Ansart said:

We cannot endorse the surrender of national sovereignties in favor of supranational authority, and we will not accept...the trend toward atlantism.¹¹⁴

The following year, with the growing economic crisis, the tone became more strident, e.g.:

The concept of the nation is not for us an outmoded expression.¹¹⁵

Later in the same year, after the election victory of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the resulting French rapprochement to Europe, Ansart became even more specific. He said:

We have always said in this House that we would not in any circumstances suffer any breach of our independence, our national sovereignty, even on the pretext of European cooperation... In any case, French policy must be decided in Paris, and not in any other European or world capital, and least of all in Washington.¹¹⁶

This extreme position was reechoed in February, 1975, when Ansart insisted that "decisions concerning France will be taken independently in Paris and nowhere else."¹¹⁷ This statement was made in connection with an attack on the proposal for direct election of EP members, which Ansart described

114. Ansart, Debates, 4 July, 1973, p. 111.

115. Ansart, Debates, 13 March, 1974, p. 55.

116. Ansart, Debates, 13 November, 1974, p. 127.

117. Ansart, Debates, 19 February, 1975, p. 173.

as "more a gimmick (alibi) than a sign of real democratization of the Community."

The PCI position, on the other hand, has from the beginning accepted the principle of the limitation of national sovereignty as an inevitable feature of today's world. As Leonilde Iotti put it in 1971:

There has arisen a necessity for development in the world economy which necessarily exceeds the narrowness of national boundaries and leads...toward supranational agreements and forms of integration which are capable of responding to the economic problems of the modern world.¹¹⁸

It is therefore the PCI's duty to promote this on-going process, and to democratize the Community through a revision of the Treaty of Rome,

. . . to work within the contradictions [of European integration], and to modify their character (per modificarne il segno).¹¹⁹

In a word, the PCI is committed to working from within, while the PCF still feels that it must stand on the defensive.

A good example of the interplay which arises between these attitudes within the CAG was furnished by the debate in November, 1974, over the proposed three billion dollar Community loan to be raised throughout the world, including the OPEC nations, for the purpose of re-lending the proceeds to EC members experiencing economic difficulties. The PCF

118. Iotti, "Sovranita Nazionale," p. 81.

119. Ibid. Segno here refers to the mathematical characters + and -.

speaker stressed the growing divergences in the economies of the Nine, arising from the "increasingly fierce competition of big business." The remedy for these divergences is the creation of "large national services, which cannot be subjected to or indulge in speculations." The spokesman for the PCF said:

The Community loan is a foretaste of the surrender of national policies...a solution which gives the German Federal Republic the opportunity to claim openly the supremacy of West German capital within the Common Market, and which merely bolsters the strong at the expense of the weak.¹²⁰

The PCI spokesman, on the other hand, declared his party to be:

... basically in favor [of the Community loan], in that it offers the very slight but nevertheless existent possibility of control...[and should be] seen as the creation of a new instrument whose aim is to limit the anarchical and speculative nature of internal capital movements.¹²¹

Other examples of Franco-Italian policy differences with respect to direct elections of EP delegates and the Community's policy toward multinationals have already been dealt with.¹²² These differences all flow from the two parties' varying approaches to the question of sovereignty, and constitute as well a reflection of differing electoral objectives. Further factors also enter into the CAG's self-appreciation of its own internal differences. Giorgio

120. Bordu, Debates, 13 November, 1974, p. 135.

121. Leonardi, Debates, 13 November, 1974, p. 135.

122. See pp. 77-83 and 95-99 above.

Amendola attributes a part of the problem to the fact that France (and Britain) are both older nations than are Italy (or Germany), and that therefore the emphasis of the former two tends to be more nationally than Community oriented. As he put it, "the French are much less open than we are."¹²³ They do not manifest the variety of opinions which the PCI expresses. Italian communists are already Europeanized because of the magnitude of the emigrant workers problem, a problem not shared by the French party in the same form.

One topic on which there seems to have been less PCF-PCI friction within the EP than outside its walls was the problem of the behavior of the Portuguese Communist Party in the spring and early summer of 1975. While press reports stressed the tensions between the PCF and the PCI over Portugal's road to socialism and the role of the PCP therein,¹²⁴ in the EP itself Ansart, speaking on behalf of the CAG as a whole, merely supported heartily the proposed EC aid to Portugal, and asked that the debate be limited to this one aspect of the Portuguese situation.¹²⁵ Earlier Bordu had spoken of "the pluralism which is being created in politics in Portugal,"¹²⁶ a theme which already had been sounded by

123. Author's interview with G. Amendola, June 10, 1975.

124. K. S. Karol, "L'Obsession Portugaise," Le Nouvel Observateur, June 2, 1975, pp. 31-33.

125. Ansart, Debates, 18 June, 1975, p. 124.

126. Bordu, Debates, 11 April, 1975, p. 197.

Berlinguer at the PCI XIVth Congress in Milan on March 18, 1975.¹²⁷ Subsequent developments in Portugal, the November 1975 Marchais-Berlinguer meeting with its stress on pluralism, and the general tone of the February 1976 XXIInd Congress of the PCF also might suggest that the basic PCF-PCI understanding over Portugal was a good deal wider than press reports indicated at the time.

In style and general behavior there are also important differences between the PCI and PCF members of the EP. The PCF's tendency toward hyperbole, especially when it comes to sovereignty questions, already has been noted. Like the PCI in 1969, the PCF came to the EP with something of a chip on its shoulder. During the first year of participation, PCF speakers tended to spend more time on heavily charged ideological and human rights issues,--such as the role of the multinationals, the perils of American hegemony, or the specter of the revival of German chauvinism,--rather than on matters of substantive concern. This behavior recapitulated the Italian experience. As Amendola pointed out, the PCI had come to Strasbourg, after a long period of exclusion, expecting to encounter a hostile attitude;¹²⁸ hence their early sensitivity on questions such as representation and the formation of a parliamentary group. When little hostility

127. L'Unita, March 24, 1975, pp. 3, 4.

128. Amendola interview, June 10, 1975.

was encountered, the feeling of defensiveness disappeared. Today, with the exception of the rather exuberant Sicilian, Senator Nicola Cipolla, one no longer finds any of the sort of good-natured face-to-face parliamentary antagonism on the part of PCI members which used to enliven past Strasbourg debates. Similarly, PCF delegates have tended, especially in the last year or two, to speak much more to the issues and to appeal less to the emotions of potential listeners at home or elsewhere.

2. Danish Distinctions.

The position taken by the Danish delegate in the CAG flows from two overriding considerations. In the first place, he is not a communist per se, but an "ally" from the Danish Socialist People's Party (SFP), a group which split from the Danish Communist Party (DKP) in 1959, under the leadership of the former DKP leader, Aksel Larsen. Secondly, both the SFP and the DKP voted against Denmark's joining the Community in the referendum of October, 1972. Since 1973, the SFP delegate has officially represented both parties in the EP. The SFP continues to oppose Denmark's membership in the Community and is on record as seeking an opportunity to secure Denmark's withdrawal from the EC. At the meeting of the SFP Party Board on June 15, 1975, it was resolved that the party would fight plans to develop the EC into a European union, would oppose any surrender of sovereignty and maintain Denmark's veto through the Council of Ministers, would oppose

direct elections of the EP "and all of their consequences;" would oppose the "strengthening of capitalism by means of wide-ranging harmonising of legislation;" and would promote publicity about the work of the EC "so that it may be brought under control." This program toward Europe should be complemented by greater efforts toward cooperation on a purely Nordic basis.¹²⁹

The Danish delegate has therefore tried consistently to adhere to the narrowest possible interpretation of the fact of Denmark's membership in the EC. In the SFP's opinion, the Danish referendum which approved the country's membership in effect froze the political situation as of the date of the referendum (October 2, 1972). Therefore any further development of European integration, such as steps toward economic and monetary union, which had not already been agreed to by the Danish parliament prior to the referendum, were subject to renegotiation. Denmark's approval or concurrence should not be assumed in advance.¹³⁰

As a further qualification of his position, each successive Danish delegate has been careful to point out that he is one of the "Allied" factors in the CAG, and not a member

129. Modstanden imod EF's Ensretning ma Øges, Resolution II of the SFP Party Board, June 15, 1975, kindness of the Danish CAG secretary.

130. Dich, Debates, 3 July, 1973, p. 36; Maigaard, Debates, 9 July, 1974, p. 93.

of a communist party.¹³¹ On one occasion Per Dich made it clear that he did not associate himself with a resolution of the CAG which, in his opinion, downgraded the persecution of intellectuals in the USSR.¹³²

3. Dutch Particularities.

The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) shares the SFP's opposition to its country's membership in the EC. Since October, 1974, a CPN delegate has been a member of the CAG. As of the end of the June 1975 session, this delegate had not yet taken the floor. Thus the CPN's position must be deduced from other sources. The CAG Information Bulletin (I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo) for September-October, 1974, quotes an interview by the Dutch newspaper Koog aan zaan with Wessel Hartog, the CPN delegate. When asked why, since his party opposed the EC, he had accepted his seat at Strasbourg, Mr. Hartog replied:

Because you cannot turn the clock back sixteen years. It's a fact that the Community exists. Now that we have the opportunity to exercise our influence in the EP, we do so.¹³³

The CPN's position has obviously not yet been fully clarified. One author, Neil McInnes, has thrown an interesting, albeit somewhat esoteric sidelight on Dutch CAG

131. Dich, Debates, 18 September, 1973, p. 11; Maigaard, Debates, 16 January, 1974, pp. 133-134.

132. Dich, Ibid.

133. I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo, 1974/2, p. 12.

membership. While it is the CPN's policy to work for the withdrawal of the Netherlands from both the EC and NATO, "in order to contribute to her security by means of an independent policy,"¹³⁴ it would be "dogmatism"--according to the CPN--to walk out now, while at the same time it would be "revisionism" to seek to infiltrate the European institutions in order to "democratize" them.¹³⁵

Institutionalized Inter-party Cooperation in the CAG. Structural inter-party cooperation within the CAG is simple and straightforward, based on the size of each delegation. In 1975, an Italian, Amendola, was Chairman of the Group; a Frenchman, Ansart, was Vice Chairman; and the only Dane, Maigaard, was Treasurer. The Dutch delegate, being a recent arrival, as of June 1975 held no office. The secretariat was led by an Italian, Bruno Ferrero, as Secretary General,¹³⁶ with a Frenchman, Daniel Debatisse, as Assistant Secretary General (adjoint). There were several additional Italian and French personnel, and one Danish Secretary, Niels Larsen.

In June, 1974, the CAG established four study groups, charged with determining priority objectives on which

134. Politiek en Cultuur, No. 3, 1973, p. 142.

135. Neil McInnes, "The Communist parties of Western Europe and the EEC," The World Today, February, 1974, p. 82.

136. In 1976, Ferrero was succeeded by Roberto Viezzi.

to base parliamentary initiatives. The study groups are to "avail themselves of the united contribution of the entirety of democratic forces (si avvarrà del contributo unitario dell'insieme delle forze democratiche)."¹³⁷

The study groups are composed as follows:

1. Improvement of the conditions of life and work (Cipolla, Fabbrini, Goutmann, Lemoine, Marras).
2. Monopolistic integration and the workers' struggle. National independence and European independence (Bordu, D'Angelosante, Leonardi, Maigaard).
3. Security and cooperation in Europe (Carettoni, D'Angelosante, Iotti, Lemoine, Leonardi).
4. New relations with the developing nations. (Goutmann, Iotti, Sandri).

Neither the CAG Chairman nor the Vice Chairman has been assigned to any of the study groups. Of the remaining members, about one-half are members of more than one group.

Is the CAG in fact a Political Group? The answer to this question would depend upon the respondent. A French staff member of the CAG told the author that the PCF regards the Group as primarily an administrative arrangement. Any convergences in political line are agreed on a party-to-party basis, not as a group undertaking.¹³⁸ The Danish delegate said that he was a member of the group chiefly because of the facilities it offers. The EP is a good place to

137. I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo, 1974/1, p. 17.

138. Author's interview with Sylvain Dreyfus, Strasbourg, June 15, 1976.

find out what is going on in European politics and to keep in touch with the European left. He felt there was no CAG European policy as such, even though there was some within-group discussion and a resulting paralellism in voting.¹³⁹ A rumor persists in Strasbourg that the Dutch CPN may withdraw from the EP and be replaced by another Dutch left-wing group.¹⁴⁰ All this would indicate a very low degree of cohesiveness indeed. It even opens up the possibility--albeit remote--that a general reorganization of the left-wing parties in the EP may occur, with a new group to be formed with the PCI and the British Labor Party as its nucleus. This new group would replace both the CAG and the somewhat uncomfortable association the Labor Party shares today with the more conservative continental Social Democratic parties in the EP.¹⁴¹

139. Author's interview with Jens Maigaard, Strasbourg, June 16, 1976.

140. Author's interview with Schelto Patijn, Strasbourg, June 15, 1976.

141. Author's interview with John Fitzmaurice, Brussels, June 8, 1976.

CHAPTER V

CONSEQUENCES OF CAG PARTICIPATION IN THE EP

Impact on EC Policy

It is difficult to assess the extent of the CAG's impact on EC policy. In the first place, while the Commission and the Council may pay attention to what the EP says, the public in general is largely ignorant of what the EP has done, and is even only dimly aware of its existence. Secondly, the EP's procedure does not lend itself to quantitative measurement. Votes are recorded as simply the approval or defeat of a resolution, motion, or amendment, with no indication as to how the groups or individual members voted.

The Problem of Impact Determination. The low salience of European problems in the public mind of the nine member states, and among CP sympathizers in each, is well illustrated by the raw data gathered by Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-René Rabier in their 1973 European Communities Study.¹ For example, 78 percent of the French and 72 percent of the Italian respondents to a survey conducted in 1973 indicated that they had only a little interest, or no interest at all,

1. R. Inglehart and J. -R. Rabier, principal investigators, 1973 European Communities Survey (Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1974). Original fractional percentages have been rounded off.

in the problems of the EC. Six percent of the Italians and 2 percent of the French respondents did not even know whether or not they were interested at all! Within this sea of disinterest, respondents who felt "closest to" the two large West European communist parties show sharp and predictable differences. PCF sympathizers registered the least interest of any French political party in the problems of the EC (84 percent, a substantially greater percentage of disinterest than the national average); and the number of PCF respondents who indicated a high degree of interest (14 percent) was well below the national average. Disinterest here, of course, may also indicate a degree of antipathy toward the EC, which was demonstrated in responses to other questions in the survey.² PCI adherents, on the other hand, showed a lesser degree of disinterest than either Italian DC or MSI voters, or 24.52 percent, as compared to a national average of 29 percent. Sixty-five percent of PCI sympathizers indicated only a little or no interest at all in EC problems, somewhat less than the national average of 73 percent. PCI respondents were generally substantially more interested in EC problems than their French PCF colleagues.

Danish SFP adherents indicating no interest at all in EC problems coincided with the national average of about

2. See discussion on following pages, and Appendix I.

19 percent, the highest rate of disinterest for any EC member.³ Seventy percent of all Danish respondents said they had only a little or no interest at all in EC problems. The Dutch CPN respondents showed the least interest of any Dutch partisan or non-partisan grouping (46 percent of CPN respondents answered "not at all interested") as opposed to a national average of 27 percent.⁴ Seventy-four percent of all Dutch respondents had only a little or no interest in EC problems.

The degree of information about EC problems readily available to the average national of an EC state is also inadequate in the respondents' opinion. Eighty-three percent of the Italians, 71 percent of the Dutchmen, 67 percent of the Frenchmen, and 61 percent of the Danes interviewed either believed themselves insufficiently informed about the EC or did not know whether or not they were in fact sufficiently or insufficiently informed. Within this sea of self-confessed ignorance, PCI respondents felt themselves somewhat better informed than the average Italian, while SFP respondents felt themselves much worse informed than did their fellow Danes. PCF and CPN respondents were close to their national averages.

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3. Danish CP (DKP) responses are not listed separately in the Survey.
 4. The Dutch responses must be treated with a certain reserve, since the CPN responses were gathered from only thirteen respondents, or 0.85 percent of the total sample.

Even among those who are interested in and informed about the EC, the degree of attachment to the Community is low by both subjective and pragmatic criteria. When asked how they would feel if the EC were to be abolished tomorrow, 58 percent of the Italians, 57 percent of the Frenchmen, 48 percent of the Dutchmen, and 41 percent of the Danes interviewed either did not know or stated that they would greet such an event with indifference. In line with Danish ambivalence about the EC, 29 percent of the Danish respondents said that they would be relieved by such an abolition, while only a very few of those of other nationalities felt that way. Among CP sympathizers, 42 percent of the Italians said that they would be "very sorry," while 75 percent of the Danes said they would be "relieved" at the news of such a development. There is also an interesting variation in the responses to this question between respondents under and over twenty-five years of age. In the case of France and Italy those under twenty-five tend to be less indifferent, and more pro-EC, by up to six percentage points, while younger Danish and Dutch respondents are more indifferent to, disinterested in, and less sympathetic toward the EC.

When it comes to paying "a little more" in taxes to bring about the unification of Europe, a general unwillingness is to be noted among all nationalities, with the CP's leading the other political groups in all four countries. Younger respondents were somewhat more willing to make a financial

sacrifice, in every case. Overall, Frenchmen were the least willing to pay more taxes, followed closely by the Danes; and the Italians were the most willing.

Within this context of ignorance and general apathy with respect to the EC, knowledge of the role of the European Parliament is certainly not widespread. The only question in the 1973 survey which mentioned any parliament at all had to do with direct elections for "a European Parliament." The question was phrased in such a way that the respondent could have replied intelligently without indicating whether or not he knew that an indirectly elected parliament was already in existence and functioning. Even so, the percentage of people who did not know how to respond to this question, and therefore were presumably unaware of the existence of the Parliament at the present time was notably high, in comparison with other problems of comparable technical complexity. Responding "don't know" to this question were 30.49 percent of the Frenchmen, 24.35 percent of the Italians, 21.52 percent of the Dutchmen, and 20.02 percent of the Danes.

Direct Impact of CAG Participation in the EP. The direct impact of CP participation in the EP is difficult to measure for three reasons. In the first place, it was not until after the CAG was formed late in 1973 that it was possible for communists to be assigned rapporteurships. It is true, of course, that the rapporteur must present the viewpoint of the majority of his committee. Nevertheless, the

rapporteur plays a key role in developing the EP's opinion on Council actions, and his own political opinions can weigh heavily in the drafting thereof.⁵ The first such an assignment of a CAG rapporteurship was made on February 18, 1974. The Committee on Energy, Research, and Technology assigned Silvio Leonardi the report on the investigation of the supply of energy available to the EC, and how it relates to collaboration with interested third countries.

Secondly, few roll-call votes are held in EP plenary sessions, which prevents any clear indication of solidarity on the part of other EP groups with the CAG, or even their response to CAG initiatives. Finally, the parliamentary committee sessions are secret, and their records, which might be the best indication of the persuasive power of CAG input, are closed to public scrutiny. As in many parliaments, by the time an initiative reaches the EP floor for general debate, the lines pro and con have already been drawn; and few votes are ever switched as a result of arguments presented from the floor. This is particularly noticeable in the EP, where party loyalty and group cohesiveness are probably higher than in a national parliament.⁶

5. Cf: Fitzmaurice, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

6. Gerda Zellentin, Formen der Willensbildung in den europäischen Organisationen (Frankfurt/Main: Athenaeum Verlag, 1965), p. 87.

Until the end of 1973, because of the disqualification of the non-inscrit EP members from rapporteurships, the communist delegates represented only themselves in public debates. However, between March 1974 and March 1975, the first parliamentary year in which rapporteurships were available to the CAG, CAG members performed this function on seven occasions, dealing with energy, relations with developing countries, labor and social affairs, and agricultural matters.⁷

In the absence of hard data on CAG impact on EP decision-making, a few subjective impressions may be useful. U. W. Kitzinger noted in an interview that there had been an almost total absence of partisan conflict in the EP until the arrival of the Italian CP members in 1969. Since then there has been greater questioning of initiatives which because of their European style and content might earlier have been accepted without question, regardless of their merits. John Fitzmaurice believes that the CAG has raised questions on social issues which would not have been raised by other groups. L. Peressich, chef de cabinet of Commissioner Spinelli,⁸ feels that the communist EP members have not taken

7. Parlamento Europeo, Gruppo Comunisti e Apparentati, Attività del Gruppo, dal Luglio 1974 al Gennaio 1976 (Luxembourg: Documentazione a cura del Segretariato, 1976), p. 31-33.

8. Author's interview in Brussels, June 8, 1976.

full advantage of their position in connection with the new budgetary procedure. The CAG's direct impact on this aspect of the Parliament's work has been less than that of other political groups. On the other hand, some CAG initiatives have been remarkably successful. Peressich particularly recalled the resolution freezing relations with Spain in November 1975, because of political repression there shortly before Franco's death. The CAG, with the assistance of the Socialists were able to muster a majority for the resolution, taking advantage of the fact that there were many absentees among the more conservative EP members at the time the vote was taken.

Other CAG initiatives which have been successfully adopted by the Parliament have been the war crimes resolution (July, 1974); the resolution on the extradition of a convicted war criminal, Klaus Barbie; and the calling of the Tripartite Conferences on matters of concern to the trade unions (1974 and 1975).

The CAG's efforts, also previously discussed, on behalf of the Italian tobacco farmers, as well as the calling of the special EP session on the agricultural crisis in 1974, mark important instances of successful CAG impact on EC action.

Impact of CAG Extra-Parliamentary Actions. Under this heading will be considered three exemplary cases of extra-parliamentary action. No exhaustive treatment of this

aspect of CAG work will be attempted. The first example is that of the press conference in Strasbourg. This type of effort is usually not very rewarding. Public interest in the activities of the EP is very low indeed, and press coverage of EP sessions is at best spotty and confined to events such as the belated arrival of the Labour Party delegates in July 1975, or one-time occasions such as the arrest of Danish delegates for disturbing the peace in a Strasbourg nightclub.⁹ Resolutions and opinions of the Parliament, the debates, questions, and censurings have little or no echo in the European or world press.

The writer witnessed two press conferences held the same day in Strasbourg by the PCF delegation on the question of the Berufsverbot, the measures taken in West Germany to prevent the hiring of left-wingers as teachers and government employees. The first conference was held at noon in the Maison de l'Europe, attended by some twenty-five journalists, interested delegates, and visitors. The second was sponsored by the Bas-Rhin Federation of the PCF, and was held in the Maison des Syndicats with a somewhat smaller attendance. Discernible press coverage of the event was confined to a short article in the next morning's L'Humanité. The local

9. "Letter from Strasbourg," The New Yorker, September 15, 1975, p. 102.

press in Strasbourg did not cover either event.

At the press conferences PCF and PCI delegates introduced SPD and DKP¹⁰ members of the German Initiative "Weg mit den Berufsverboten," whom they had also presented or were about to present to the President of the EP and a representative of the Commission. An oral question was also tabled for the EP session for the following day, June 18, which was accompanied by a brief discussion on the floor of the Parliament. Sir Christopher Soames, the Commissioner who was answering questions that day, handled the matter by pointing out that he was sure that the CAG spokesman, M. Ansart, would not want him to pursue a line of reasoning which would lead to the conclusion that the item at issue was entirely a West German internal matter.¹¹

An example of extra-Parliamentary activity on the part of CAG members, not related to a particular EP session, is offered by the meeting organized on November 23-25, 1971, in Rome by the Centro di Studi di Politica Economica (CESPE) of the PCI, under the title of "The Italian Communist and Europe." This meeting was the fourth of a series on the development of Italian capitalism within the framework of the world economy. While the principal participants in the meeting were CAG members (Amendola, Iotti, Leonardi, Cipolla,

10. Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, the West German Communist Party.

11. Soames, Debates, 18 June, 1975, p. 117.

D'Angelosante, Fabbrini, and Sandri), other leading PCI members also took part (Segrè and Pajetta), as well as non-PCI Italian political leaders (Scarascia-Mugnozza, Scalia, Terracini, Corona), and a number of foreigners of various political persuasions: Jacques Kahn (PCF), Hendrikus Vredeling (Dutch Socialist), and representatives of the Soviet, East German, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Spanish, Belgian, British, Rumanian, and Greek communist parties.

The meeting provided the PCI its first opportunity, since joining the EP in 1969, to give a public exposition of its objectives in the EC, and to adduce and publicize a large amount of informational material supporting its positions. The public sessions were well-attended, and the meeting received wide coverage in the official and unofficial Italian communist press, and moderate coverage in some non-communist papers. A complete record of the meeting has been published.¹²

An entirely different type of expository action is exemplified by the meeting held in Bonn and Köln on March 13-16, 1973, by the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, which provided the PCI with a distinguished international forum from which to explain its viewpoint. The meeting was chiefly concerned with the PCI's political conception of the European Community. From the EP

12. Quaderni di Politica ed Economia 3, Supplemento al N.6, novembre-dicembre della rivista bimestrale del CESPE.

Group came Amendola and Leonardi, plus Ferrero, until 1976 Secretary General of the CAG, and Professor Ernesto Ragionieri of the University of Florence, a member of the PCI Central Committee.

This meeting was essentially an informal discussion, the results of which were published in an Erfahrungsbericht by the Bundesinstitut.¹³ Not only was PCI policy toward the EC set forth in detail, but interesting insights into Soviet policy, as well as comments on Italian domestic policy and future PCI-PSI and PCI-DC relations, also appeared in the Erfahrungsbericht.

Impact of EP Membership on Participating Parties

During the period under review (1969-1975) a change has taken place, at least in the case of the political parties from the larger countries, in the roles they each play within their own national sub-systems. While this development was contemporaneous with EP membership, it is not possible to demonstrate empirically a causal link between EP membership and role change, owing to the large number of variables involved. However, these changes should be noted, since their coincidence with the period of EP membership calls

13. March, 1973.

attention to a consistency of political behavior, the result of which has been a greater support for Community institutions.

The PCI, for example, has moved on the domestic scene from a position of calling for a "unity of the left" to one which beginning in 1973 has called for a "historic compromise" in the form of a coalition with the Church-oriented Democrazia Cristiana. In his maiden EP speech in 1969, Amendola placed "the unity of the forces of the left in every country of Europe in the struggle for peace and the affirmation of a socialist democracy" as the second most important objective of the party, just after the overcoming of the military blocs.¹⁴ At the Rome session on European policy in 1971, he repeated this demand, saying that the unity of the left is the first condition of reaching a true unity in all of Europe.¹⁵ Between 1971 and the enunciation of the compromesso storico in 1973, the Italian parties experienced the presidential election of 1971 and the failure of the PCI-PSI coalition to gain a victory at that time for their candidate, Gaetano de Martino, a Socialist. In 1973 the Allende débacle in Chile showed that even 51 per cent was not a sufficient majority with which to carry out a revolution. It was out of this background that the historic compromise arose, as a means of moving toward shared responsibility for the government of an increasingly crisis-ridden Italy.

14. Amendola, Débats¹² mars, 1939, p. 39.

15. Amendola, "Introduzione", I Comunisti Italiani e l'Europa, p. 16.

Chief among the promoters of the historic compromise has been PCI Politburo member, Giorgio Amendola, Chairman of the CAG, who regarded the 1973 initiative as a serious political offer to the DC leadership and not, as some PCI leaders held, a long term strategic goal.¹⁶ On the other hand, the less "European" and more conservative wing of the party, led by Pietro Ingrao, opted for the long term strategic interpretation of the compromise. Circumstantial evidence thus tends to link support for an immediate PCI understanding with the DC to the former's EP experience.¹⁷

In the period before 1969 Henry Kerr of the University of Geneva made an interesting study of the changes in attitudes of national parliamentarians after service in the EP. Kerr found that work in the EP affects the cognitive but not the affective components of members' attitudes toward European integration. Their fund of knowledge is rendered more profound, and their existing support for European unity is thereby enhanced, even though such support does not appear to be directly increased or decreased in affective terms by EP exposure. A similar study of the impact of EP

16. Heinz Timmerman, "Die Diskussion um den 'historischen Kompromiss', Beobachtungen und Bemerkungen zum 14. Kongress der IKP (März 1975)" Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln, 21/1975.

17. Sergio Pistone, "La Crisi Italiana e l'Integrazione Europea," (Unpublished MS, Facoltà di Scienza Politica, Turin, 1975).

service on CAG members would be an interesting undertaking, even though the results might not be so clear, owing to the small number of people involved and the relative shortness of the period of their membership to date in the European Parliament.

During the same period, and particularly since 1973, the PCF has undergone an important change of role internally, a change which has coincided with the two years of PCF presence in the EP. Here again it is impossible to establish anything more than the link of coincidence, despite the remarkable convergence of the PCF and PCI overall positions demonstrated in the decisions of the PCF XXIIInd Congress in February, 1976, an event which falls outside the time frame of this study.

The PCF was admitted to the EP shortly after the promulgation of the programme commun with the PS and the left-wing Radicals. As in the case of Italy, this coalition was formed with a view toward a presidential election; and in this election the left-wing candidate was defeated by a very narrow majority in the spring of 1974. The French coalition, however, barely survived the trauma of the Portuguese revolution and the subsequent high degree of tension which arose between the Portuguese Socialist and Communist Parties. The apparent impact of the Portuguese events on the PCF has been to place this party in a new role, still very much in the opposition but committed to working now

within the system. The joint PCI-PCF statement of November, 1975, guaranteed freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, religious freedom, a pluralist political system and the right of existence and activity of opposition political parties.¹⁸ The new phenomenon of "communism under French colors," introduced to the world by Georges Marchais at the recent party Congress,¹⁹ would appear to include a European dimension as well, although its content--other than a search for a rapprochement with other European communist parties--is not yet fully clear.

Coalition Building and EP Participation

The preceding section has shown the readiness, at least of the PCI and the PCF, to seek coalitions with the socialists and other parties for national ends, from the programme commun to the compromesso storico, which now may be regarded as an established trend, despite the warnings of the State Department to the European socialist parties to be wary of their dealings with the communists.²⁰

This same propensity for coalition building has also been demonstrated at the EP level, where the CAG has not hesitated to support enthusiastically the initiatives of

18. New York Times, November 18, 1976.

19. New York Times, February 4, 1976.

20. New York Times, February 6, 1976.

other parties, in particular the socialists; while non-communist parties have likewise--although somewhat more rarely--joined forces to support CAG initiatives, in the interest of common European policy objectives. For example, a CAG amendment to the Lomé Treaty of multilateral association with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, which called for non-interference in the associates' internal affairs, was supported by the Socialist Group, the rapporteur on the Treaty, and the appropriate Commission member.²¹ Nevertheless the amendment failed to pass. On two other recent occasions, the CAG co-sponsored with the Socialist Group amendments to EP opinions on energy policy and food prices.²² (Both amendments failed to pass). On the question of a tripartite labor-management-government conference, the CAG's initiative in pressing for its reconvenation in 1975 was jointly sponsored with the Socialist Group.²³ CAG cooperation of this type has not been confined to the Socialist Group. CAG spokesmen have not hesitated to support Gaullist (UDR) initiatives, such as Alain Terrenoire's question in January, 1975, on price fixing by big petroleum companies.²⁴

On a broader level, PCF and PCI spokesmen have

21. Debates, 10 December, 1974, pp. 107-108.

22. Debates, 16 January, 1975, p. 181; 20 February, 1975, p. 221.

23. Ernest Glinne (PS) Debates, 9 April, 1975, p. 110.

24. Lemoine, Debates, 16 January, 1975, pp. 207-208.

made use of the EP as a forum for proposing joint action. In March, 1974, Ansart said, speaking of building a "Europe of peace,"

There does exist a large amount of common ground for common action by the socialist and communist parties of Europe. We think it possible, we think it necessary to develop wide cooperation with the Christian forces of progress because we think, we who are not believers, that the world is not to be divided between believers and non-believers. In a word we are open to new proposals, ready for dialogue, guided by a will to unite and to gather together.²⁵

In many ways Ansart's remarks prefigured the conclusions of the PCF's XXIIInd Congress, two years later, in February, 1976.

After the coup d'état in Chile in October, 1973, the PCI gave another example of readiness for joint action with bourgeois parties. Amendola withdrew a resolution which he had proposed in favor of one sponsored by the chairmen of all political groups. He pointed out that the first signature on the resolution was that of the chairman of the Christian Democratic group, and said:

I am convinced that not only in Chile, but also in Europe, given the historical circumstances of our countries, it is only from liaison...between the major political elements, Communist, Socialist and Christian Democratic, that we can derive that political and democratic progress best suited to the interests of our peoples...²⁶

25. Ansart, Debates, 13 March, 1974, p. 55.

26. Amendola, Debates, 17 October 1973, p. 104

Prospects for a Community-wide CP

Aside from the administrative organization of the CAG itself (noted above), there has been little indication of a possibility of organizing any sort of Community-wide communist party. The objectives of each party, both nationally and at the European level, are so varied that it is difficult even to speak of any coordination of policy, to say nothing of the possibility of any sort of fusion or federation of Community parties. There has been no formal meeting of all West European communist parties since the Brussels session of January, 1974. Even at the trade union level, cooperation has been at best hesitant; and save for the joint CGT-CGIL office in Brussels, no machinery exists for policy coordination within the pro-communist wing of the trade union movement in Western Europe.

Machinery in general is a scarce item today. For all the reputed "monolithism" of the world communist system, the individual CPs are notably lacking in formal organizations for interparty policy coordination. Since the abolition of the Cominform in 1956, there has been no formal communist international coordinating organization, such as the existing Socialist and Christian Democratic Internationals, and their several geographic-area sub-groups.

Periodic conferences of most of the communist parties of the world in Moscow, now more and more infrequent compared to the 1950's and 60's, find their counterpart in the

less and less frequent meetings of all-European and West European meetings. The first meeting of purely European communist parties since the Kárlový Váry Conference of 1967 had been scheduled--after numerous postponements--to be held in the summer of 1975, between the wind-up of the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation and the XXVth Congress of the CPSU; but even this much delayed meeting was not to materialize until June, 1976. There has been no world-wide meeting of communist parties since the Moscow Conference of 1969, when Enrico Berlinguer on behalf of the PCI took the opportunity to chastize the CPSU over the occupation of Czechoslovakia.²⁷ This lack of formal meetings undoubtedly is a reflection of the divisions which separate the CP's, both at a European and at a world-wide level, as differences over China, détente, north-south dichotomies, and interparty relationships all become more pronounced. Just as the scheduling and holding of the quinquennial party congress in the Soviet Union reflects the final achievement of a high degree of prior consensus among the Soviet leadership, so the holding of an international or European conference of CP's reflects a high degree of prior consensus among the participating parties, and does not serve as a means of securing such a consensus.

27. Heinz Timmermann, "Kommunistische Gipfeltreffen 1974/75", Deutschland Archiv VII, No. 4, April, 1974, p. 403.
Cf: David Davlin, "The Interparty Drama," Problems of Communism, July-August, 1975, pp. 18-34, here p. 21.

The 1974 Brussels Conference of the Communist Parties of the Capitalist Countries of Europe--to give it its full title--illustrates this point. Called at the initiative of the PCI, the Brussels meeting was envisaged as one in a series of steps leading up at least to an all-European if not a worldwide conference of communist parties. The Brussels meeting did little to clear the way in the form of an agreement at the West European level. The final resolution of the meeting showed that there was a great variation among the parties in their attitudes toward the European Community, toward the problem of cooperation with Social Democratic and Catholic parties, toward China, and toward even the holding of a world-wide communist conference.²⁸

Since the Brussels meeting there has been no indication of change in the line of any of the CAG members (including the PCF) which would depart from the two attitudes expressed in the Brussels resolution, namely: to fight against the EC's monopolistic orientation and for its democratization (PCI and PCF), or for a total withdrawal from the EC (CPN and DKP-SFP). Neither the PCI-PCF declaration of November 17, 1975, nor the documentation of the XXIInd PCF Party Congress of February, 1976, gives any indication of a departure from the minimal agreement reached so far between the PCI and PCF on European Community questions. Fight the monopolies and democratize the institutions would seem still to represent

28. Devlin, op. cit., passim.

the extent of policy coordination. The PCF and PCI are still poles apart on the question of direct election of EP members.²⁹ A Europe-wide communist party is still probably a long way into the future.³⁰

It is interesting to note that in the case of the Socialist Group a similar situation prevails. The existence of the Socialist Group in the EP has had little effect on the role of the European socialist parties in the International, and has not overcome differences among the parties of the Nine with respect to the future development of Europe.³¹

CAG Contrasts with Other Political Groups

Specific comparisons have already been drawn between certain aspects of the CAG and other EP groups, e.g.: age and political rank of the members,³² group cohesiveness,³³ and participation in question procedures.³⁴ However, a brief description of the other groups is in order, in view of the considerable magnitude of their overall dissimilarities. It

29. Jean Kanapa, "Il faut parler clair: l'élection du parlement européen," L'Humanité, March 2, 1976.

30. Author's interview with Amendola, June 10, 1975.

31. James May, "Is there a European Socialism?" Journal of Common Market Studies XIII, 4 June, 1975, pp. 422-502.

32. See pp. 52-53, above.

33. See p. 4, above.

34. See p. 92, above.

has been seen that the CAG cannot be held to have a Group policy toward European problems in general which is more than a fortuitous (and rare) convergence of the policies of the four member parties. Also the member parties vary markedly in their allegiance to the concept of an integrated Europe, and in their concept of the role which the CAG should play in the daily workings of the European Parliament. Observation of the other groups in many cases show similar discontinuities and conflicts, or reveals that the raison d'être of some of the groups differs totally from that of the others, including the CAG.

Parliamentary political groups have been a feature of European legislatures ever since the French Revolution, and have played an indispensable role in the parliaments of Europe at least since the founding of the IIIrd French Republic.³⁵ While the Treaties of Paris and Rome, which established the ECSC and the EEC respectively, did not expressly provide for political groups in the Assembly, they have been institutionalized therein ever since June 16, 1953. Today they are six in number, not including the non-inscrits. All that is necessary to constitute a group today is that it be a "group of political affinity," that there be either fourteen members from one country or ten from at least three

35. Lina Vido, Evolution et Perspectives des Groupes Politiques du Parlement Européen (Luxembourg: Groupe Démocrate Chrétien du Parlement Européen, 1975).

different countries, and that no member be a member of another group. No EP member is required to join a parliamentary group, but may be listed as non-inscrit.

Two of the groups which today sit in the EP are for all practical purposes mono-national. The European Progressive Democrats (EPD) consist of twelve French UDR (Gaullist) members and five Irish Fianna Fail members. The EPD was formed in July, 1973, after the French elections of that year had led to a reduction in the number of UDR representatives in the EP from eighteen to twelve, making it necessary for them to form a group of mixed nationality to replace their former exclusively mono-national group. The Fianna Fail members appear to support the UDR positions on EC agricultural policy as well as their minimalist position on European integration.³⁶ EDP group cohesiveness is thus probably considerably greater than in the case of the CAG. The EPD may, like the CAG, be considered a "Major structural opposition"³⁷ in the EP, in that the EPD consistently represents the viewpoint of the UDR, which--at least until recently has often tried to block further European integration in favor of l'Europe des patries. On specific issues, however, the EPD may advocate a more European--interests.³⁸ From this

36. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 117.

37. See p. 29, above.

38. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 126.

viewpoint the position of the PCI, at least, would seem to be in the abstract more "European," and therefore less that of a structural opposition than is the case with the EPD.

The European Conservative Group (ECG), organized after Britain's accession in 1973, is even more mono-national than the present EPD, it being composed of eighteen British Conservatives and two Danes, one from the Conservative People's Party and one Centre-Democrat. As such, it overwhelmingly represents the British Conservative point of view with little or no attention paid to Danish concerns.³⁹ This view embodies a cautious but consistent pro-Europeanism, in line with traditional British Conservative Party policy. In matters of social policy the ECG may be considered to belong to the political opposition within the EP, together with the Christian Democrats, to the extent that such a majority-minority dichotomy on policy issues in fact exists.⁴⁰

The Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Socialist Groups, on the other hand are all truly multinational, with representatives of at least seven member nations in each. These are the original groups of the EP's predecessor, the Common Assembly, and represent traditional European political trends. According to Zellentin's 1966 survey, the cohesion index showed the greatest deviation in the case of the Liberals and the least in the case of the Socialists, with the

39. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 152.

40. See p. 92, above.

Christian Democrats in the middle, but close to the Liberals.⁴¹ However, this survey was made before the addition of the Labor Party representatives to the Socialist Group in July, 1975. The Labor Party delegation is not only composed mostly of anti-Common Market MP's, but also includes a Scottish Nationalist, whose position on some issues appears to be much closer to that of the Conservatives.⁴² Further disagreements within the Socialist Group would appear inevitable, as the rumor in Strasbourg that the Labor Party is seeking an alliance with the PCI would seem to foreshadow.

Meanwhile, however, there is a certain general pattern of group behavior which has conditioned the operation of the Parliament. To the extent that a majority-minority dichotomy is applicable, the core of the "governing majority" at present consists of an informal coalition of the Socialist and Liberal groups, with the external support of the European Conservative Group and some of the six non-aligned members. It is this group which probably determines the Parliament's total response to Council and Commission initiatives. However, it has been the practice of the EP to seek for consensus and unanimity both on the floor and in committee meetings to such an extent that the influence of the Socialist-Liberal leadership is very difficult to detect. All efforts are

41. Zellentin, "Form and Function," p. 422.

42. Author's personal observation, Strasbourg, June 15, 1976.

directed toward presenting a united position to the Council and Commission, one which will not be repudiated by the national parliaments. For this reason the resolutions are generally bland and non-controversial; amendments are usually withdrawn by the originator in the face of opposition, rather than allowing them to be voted on; as has been noted, roll-call votes are rare; and group opposition to any measure in committee--except in the case of the CAG--is rarely carried to the floor.⁴³

Seen thus in perspective, the CAG's lack of cohesion and imperfect functioning as an opposition is perhaps somewhat more understandable. Each political group in the EP has its particularities, and the lack of symmetry among them may only reflect the fact that the group concept which originated in the needs of the multiparty national systems is only partially adaptable to an international environment.

43. Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 197.

CHAPTER VI

Conclusions

The physical growth and political development of the CAG during the past six years has paralleled important changes on the overall European political scene. The numerical expansion of the group and the growing sophistication of its political expression have their counterpart in the increasing flexibility in the approach of these parties to problems of interparty cooperation at both the national and the European level.

The decline in direct American political pressure on Europe which has resulted from the United States' turn toward isolationism in the 1970's has led to a recrudescence of nationalism throughout Europe in which the communist parties have also shared. Polycentrism in the world communist movement, the intellectual child of Palmiro Togliatti, has grown steadily since he first spoke of it in 1956,¹ and even more rapidly since his demise in 1964, as West European and Asian communist parties and party-states have become less and less supportive of the Soviet Union and in particular its foreign policy. Separate national paths to communism are now accepted, albeit grudgingly, even by the Soviet Union.²

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1. Nuovi Argomenti No. 20 (May-June, 1956), republished in P. Togliatti, Problemi del movimento operaio internazionale, 1956-1961 (Rome: Riuniti, 1962).
 2. cf. Suslov speech to Soviet Academy of Sciences, Pravda, March 18, 1976.

The PCF, traditionally among the more loyal followers of the CPSU, now advocates a "socialism in French colors" as the party's goal.³ At the same time that the individual national parties are asserting their independence, they are reenforcing each other through cooperation at the European level, as for example in the CAG. Even though this cooperation may be halting and full of sharp differences in practice, the growing similarity in overall approach on the part of the West European CPs, following the lead of the PCI, particularly in the Latin countries, is becoming more noticeable each day. The Italian, French and Spanish CPs are now committed to the non-violent pursuit of political goals and to the maintenance of pluralistic politics, including the multiparty state, freedom of religious and cultural expression, and the abandonment of the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The future role of the Portuguese CP remains to be determined.

Is there anything in particular about the CPs of Latin Europe that gives them simultaneously a strength and flexibility not shared by the parties of the more northern, Protestant countries? Neil McInnes, echoing Franz Borkenau, has an interesting theory in this connection. He points out that in the European Catholic countries the Church and the political parties of Catholic inspiration have never devoted themselves to the pursuit of the ideal of a rational economy,

3. Parti Communiste Français, Le Socialisme pour la France (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), p. 198

while the Protestant societies of northern Europe have equated the perfection of the free market system of distribution with pure rationality. The appeal of communism as a rationalizing force has thus become irrelevant in Protestant societies today, including the United States, but it is still highly attractive in the Catholic countries, particularly in a period of modernization when material goods are becoming increasingly available.⁴

In the construction of Europe the European Parliament has a unique role to play, even though this role until now has been overlooked in the general atmosphere of neglect with which the EP has been treated since its first emanation nearly a quarter of a century ago. EC Commissioner Altiero Spinelli speaks of a "pro-European creative tension" which is kept alive and vigorous by the EP during the time when the governmental representatives on the Council of Ministers are distracted by selfish national objectives.⁵ It is indeed the Parliament which has taken the initiative in such fundamental questions as the direct election for EP members or the issuance of a European passport, which have both functional and great symbolic significance for the building of a united Europe. The CAG indubitably contributes to this "creative

4. Neil McInnes, The Western Marxists (New York: The Library Press, 1972, p. 196.

5. Altiero Spinelli, The European Adventure (London: Macmillan, 1972) p. 27.

tension" not despite but because of the differences which prevail among its members, who nonetheless are united among themselves in their decision to use a European institution as a means of articulating their disparate views. This intra-CAG dialectical process synthesizes into a far broader recognition of the possibility of West European CPs becoming more and more acceptable partners or even leaders in West European governments of the future.

In order for the CAG, functioning as an opposition, to enhance the legitimatizing function of the European Parliament in the European Community, the role the EP now plays in the Community's decision-making process must be altered. Today, the European Parliament does not reflect in representative fashion the political and national forces which are encompassed by the EC, either in its composition or in its mode of selection. Nor does the EP have an effective voice in EC decision-making. Under these circumstances, the parties composing the CAG have not developed into a legitimatizing opposition within the EP, and will not be able to do so until the Parliament is converted into a true, rule-making body for Europe.

In the present political context, the CAG, unlike the Socialist, Liberal, or Christian Democratic groups, cannot perform one of the important functions of an opposition, that of offering an alternative leadership, capable of mustering the support of a majority of the EP members. Such a coalition

could be formed among the traditional parties in various combinations, but the CAG is still not "clubbable" in that sense. Thus, despite superficial similarities to an opposition-like behavior, it cannot as yet be said that the CAG acts as a legitimatizer for the EP. The situation, however, is by no means static. If the communist-socialist alliances in France and Italy survive and grow stronger (or if--as far as Italy is concerned--the historic compromise materializes) and if the PCI and PCF in due course have their forces augmented by the addition of Greek, Portuguese, and even Spanish members to the CAG, then the role of the Group will also change. It may very well grow in cohesion, develop a truly European policy not based on domestic expediencies, and in time blossom into a genuine functioning opposition. When this will happen is a question to which only time can give the answer; that it will happen there would seem to be no question.

Meanwhile, the Berlin meeting of the European communist parties which closed on June 30, 1976, has given eloquent testimony to the existence of a new phenomenon in Marxism-Leninism, namely "Eurocommunism," or the determination of the communist parties of France, Italy and Spain to develop a type of socialism which proposes to be very much at variance with the order prevailing today in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, or the Chinese People's Republic. Eurocommunism has come to the fore simultaneously with the development of the CAG and the evolution of a West European communist policy toward the European Community which is very

different from that espoused by the Soviet Union. One day we may indeed look back upon March 12, 1969, the day the PCI made its debut in the EP, as one of those historic turning points in the political development of Europe which may delight the specialist for years to come.

APPENDIX I

SELECTED DATA FROM THE 1973 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES STUDY

The attached tables give data, broken down by political party, on interest in and knowledge about the European Community, concern for the future of the Common Market, direct elections for the European Parliament, and other issues of interest to the EC. The survey was conducted by Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-René Rabier, principal investigators, and the raw data is available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

Question: Are you personally very interested, a little interested, or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community--that is, the Common Market? (Responses tabulated in percentages by "political party you feel closest to".)

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	0.0	3.35
Very interested	23.08	22.68
A little interested	30.77	47.20
Not at all interested	46.15*	26.78

DENMARK

	SFP** 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	0.0	1.17
Very interested	35.29	28.69
A little interested	45.10	50.88
Not at all interested	19.61	19.27

* highest percentage of not at all interested of any Dutch political party.

** DKP responses were not recorded separately. Presumably they are included under "Other" (3.84% of the total sample).

Question: Are you personally very interested, a little interested, or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community--that is, the Common Market? (Responses tabulated in percentages by "political party you feel closest to.")

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.82	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	6.73	3.24	1.74	4.69	7.81	1.37	4.85	2.94	7.96	6.18
Interested	28.37	33.60	23.48	31.25	18.29	23.29	22.33	23.53	14.07	21.42
A little	40.38	41.30	58.26	53.13	41.33	53.42	41.75	55.88	40.74	43.22
Not at all	24.52	21.86	16.52	10.94	32.57	21.92	31.07	17.65	37.22	29.18

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	2.06	0.92	1.49	3.70	0.90	1.07	1.75	0.46	3.16	1.53
Interested	13.92	19.04	38.81	22.22	29.86	22.13	42.11	15.17	13.68	19.71
A little	50.52	50.46	49.25	44.44	54.75	51.73	42.11	37.24	35.00	45.49
Not at all	33.51	29.59	10.45	24.07	14.48	24.80	14.04	46.67	47.89	32.96

Question: Do you think that you are sufficiently well informed, or not sufficiently well informed, about the problems of the European Community--that is, the Common Market?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of the total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	0.0	17.83
Sufficiently well informed	23.08	28.55
Insufficiently informed	76.92	53.62

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	3.92	8.17
Sufficiently well informed	24.51	36.53
Insufficiently informed	71.57	55.30

Question: Do you think that you are sufficiently well informed, or not sufficiently well informed, about the problems of the European Community--that is, the Common Market?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.82	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	3.37	5.67	0.0	3.13	10.10	4.11	3.88	2.94	7.41	6.50
Sufficiently	23.56	21.46	20.00	31.25	13.71	19.18	24.27	20.59	11.85	17.13
Insufficiently	73.08	72.87	80.00	65.63	76.19	76.71	71.84	76.47	80.74	76.38

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	11.34	11.93	7.46	16.67	4.07	9.60	7.02	19.77	30.79	15.36
Sufficiently	30.93	30.96	31.34	27.78	37.10	40.53	35.09	32.41	26.32	32.69
Insufficiently	56.70	57.11	61.19	55.56	58.82	49.87	57.89	47.59	42.89	51.82

Question: If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent, or relieved?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of the total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	7.69	13.25
Very sorry	30.77	46.31
Indifferent	53.85	36.54
Relieved	7.69	3.89

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	4.90	12.09
Very sorry	4.90	30.28
Indifferent	14.71	29.02
Relieved	75.49	28.31

Question: If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent, or relieved?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.82	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	11.54	11.34	10.43	9.38	17.71	8.22	11.65	5.88	17.41	14.51
Very sorry	41.83	45.34	53.91	59.38	43.24	54.79	41.75	38.24	29.63	40.96
Indifferent	43.75	42.91	33.91	29.69	38.86	35.62	41.75	52.94	51.85	43.27
Relieved	2.88	0.40	1.74	1.56	0.19	1.37	4.85	2.94	1.11	1.26

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	10.82	10.09	13.43	14.81	5.43	9.07	7.02	10.80	23.95	12.35
Very sorry	28.87	42.66	50.75	48.15	61.54	50.93	68.42	34.38	28.42	41.72
Indifferent	52.06	43.81	31.34	33.33	31.22	37.87	24.56	51.26	44.74	42.61
Relieved	8.25	2.98	2.99	3.70	0.90	0.27	0.0	2.07	2.11	2.38

Question: Are you for or against the election of a European parliament by a popular vote of all the citizens in the member states of the European Community?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	15.38	21.58
Completely favor	30.77	32.72
Favor on the whole	30.77	29.71
Disagree in general	15.38	11.00
Disagree completely	7.69	4.99

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	8.82	20.02
Completely favor	20.59	20.18
Favor on the whole	13.73	16.35
Disagree in general	15.69	18.43
Disagree completely	41.18*	25.02

*highest percentage of any Danish political party.

Question: Are you for or against the election of a European parliament by a popular vote of all the citizens in the member states of the European Community?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.82	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	18.75	14.57	10.43	6.25	28.57	12.33	13.59	8.82	36.30	24.25
Completely for	41.83	44.53	44.35	46.88	30.48	47.95	32.04	41.18	24.44	34.15
Generally for	23.56	31.17	33.04	34.38	31.05	31.51	34.95	38.24	27.78	29.91
Generally no	5.77	6.88	6.96	7.81	6.48	4.11	12.62	5.88	9.26	7.54
Completely no	10.10	2.83	5.22	4.69	3.43	4.11	6.80	5.88	2.22	4.14

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	29.90	22.94	13.43	22.22	19.91	21.33	15.79	37.24	53.42	30.49
Completely for	19.07	25.46	37.31	37.04	28.51	22.40	45.61	16.05	15.53	22.32
Generally for	29.38	31.65	34.33	14.81	28.96	36.80	21.05	28.51	18.95	28.65
Generally no	10.31	12.39	8.96	20.37	13.57	13.87	14.04	11.26	7.11	11.54
Completely no	10.82	7.57	5.97	5.56	8.60	5.60	3.51	6.67	4.74	6.83

Question: Are you, yourself, for or against the Common Market developing into a political European union? If for or against, how strongly do you feel about it?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	15.38	22.40
Completely favor	15.38	20.83
Favor on the whole	61.54	33.47
Disagree in general	7.69	14.14
Disagree completely	0.0	9.15

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	3.92	14.35
Completely favor	3.92	11.26
Favor on the whole	7.84	16.76
Disagree in general	23.53	25.69
Disagree completely	60.78	31.94

Question: Are you, yourself, for or against the Common Market developing into a political European union? If for or against: How strongly do you feel about it?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.82	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	17.79	14.17	10.43	4.69	28.57	12.33	13.59	11.76	33.89	23.42
Completely for	34.62	44.13	46.96	42.19	28.95	49.32	35.92	32.35	23.33	32.69
Generally for	31.25	32.79	32.17	42.19	33.14	31.51	35.92	38.24	29.44	32.27
Generally no	9.62	7.29	7.83	7.81	6.67	4.11	8.74	11.76	9.26	8.01
Completely no	6.73	1.62	2.61	3.13	2.67	2.74	5.83	5.88	4.07	3.61

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	24.74	21.10	11.94	16.67	14.03	21.33	14.04	32.64	48.16	27.17
Completely for	14.43	28.44	43.28	27.78	34.84	26.67	45.61	19.08	17.89	24.79
Generally for	38.66	34.17	26.87	25.93	38.91	36.00	28.07	29.89	23.68	32.11
Generally no	12.89	12.61	8.96	25.93	9.95	10.67	10.53	12.41	6.05	11.00
Completely no	9.28	3.67	5.97	3.70	2.26	5.33	1.75	5.75	3.95	4.76

Question: Would you, or would you not, be willing to make some personal sacrifice--for example, pay a little more taxes to help bring about the unification of Europe?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	0.0	7.65
Very willing	15.38	12.91
Fairly willing	15.38	28.48
Not very willing	23.08	23.09
Not at all willing	46.15*	27.87

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	2.94	6.67
Very willing	4.90	6.51
Fairly willing	11.76	29.52
Not very willing	30.39	27.69
Not at all willing	50.00*	29.61

*most not at all willing of any Dutch or Danish political party.

Question: Would you, or would you not, be willing to make some personal sacrifice-- for example, pay a little more taxes to help bring about the unification of Europe?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.82	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	8.65	8.50	6.09	7.81	12.38	6.85	6.80	2.94	13.52	10.58
Very willing	9.13	12.96	13.04	17.19	9.90	13.70	9.71	14.71	5.74	9.69
Fairly	37.50	42.11	48.70	54.69	41.90	45.21	28.16	38.24	31.85	38.76
Not very	15.87	19.43	14.78	12.50	16.00	20.55	28.16	11.76	26.48	19.96
Not at all	28.85	17.00	17.39	7.81	19.81	13.70	27.18	32.35	22.41	21.01

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	4.64	7.11	4.48	7.41	5.43	6.67	3.51	11.95	21.05	9.88
Very willing	4.64	6.65	11.94	3.70	9.05	7.20	12.28	6.44	2.89	6.33
Fairly	19.59	21.79	29.85	38.89	33.48	29.60	26.32	18.62	16.58	23.35
Not very	18.56	21.33	14.93	16.67	22.17	21.07	15.79	18.39	13.95	18.81
Not at all	52.58	42.43	38.81	33.33	29.86	35.47	42.11	44.37	45.53	41.45

Question: Achieving a common foreign policy is a problem the European Community is concerned with at present. Can you say whether in your view this problem is very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	7.69	12.64
Very important	30.77	27.66
Fairly important	23.08	35.11
Not very important	30.77	17.69
Not at all important	7.69	6.90

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	1.96	4.92
Very important	15.69	21.37
Fairly important	13.73	25.13
Not very important	26.47	23.21
Not at all important	42.16	25.29

Question: Achieving a common foreign policy is a problem the European Community is concerned with at present. Can you say whether in your view this problem is very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.83	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	1.44	1.62	1.74	0.0	5.14	1.37	3.88	0.0	6.30	3.93
Very important	36.54	42.11	45.22	56.25	31.62	50.68	32.04	38.24	26.11	34.47
Fairly	34.62	36.03	32.17	29.69	37.52	42.47	41.75	29.41	36.11	36.30
Not very	20.19	15.79	16.52	7.81	19.05	2.74	14.56	23.53	23.70	18.75
Not at all	7.21	4.45	4.35	6.25	6.67	2.74	7.77	8.82	7.78	6.55

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	11.86	8.72	10.45	3.70	6.33	9.87	14.04	13.56	26.84	13.11
Very important	18.39	18.56	25.69	25.37	31.22	23.47	40.35	18.39	13.95	21.96
Fairly	38.66	38.76	41.79	46.30	42.08	44.27	28.07	35.63	31.05	38.17
Not very	21.13	18.81	11.94	27.78	16.74	15.47	14.04	19.31	18.68	18.19
Not at all	9.79	8.03	8.96	1.85	3.62	6.93	3.51	13.10	9.47	8.53

Question: As for the future, do you think the movement toward the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down or continued as it is at present?

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	7.69	14.96
Speeded up	46.15	32.45
Continued as at present	46.15	46.65
Slowed down	0.0	5.94

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	5.88	8.34
Speeded up	10.78	12.09
Continued as at present	16.67	43.79
Slowed down	66.67*	35.78

*highest percentage for slowing down of any Danish political party.

Question: As for the future, do you think the movement toward the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down or continued as it is at present?

ITALY

Party	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI	Other	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	10.90	12.94	6.02	3.35	27.50	3.83	5.40	1.78	28.29	100.00
DK., no reply	23.56	13.77	11.30	6.25	29.71	10.96	18.45	17.65	33.52	24.62
Speeded up	56.25	67.61	70.43	82.81	51.81	71.23	54.37	55.88	42.41	54.79
No change	15.38	17.41	17.39	10.94	17.33	17.81	25.24	20.59	20.37	18.28
Slowed down	3.70	4.81	1.21	0.87	0.0	1.14	0.0	1.94	5.88	3.70

FRANCE

Party	PCF	PS	PSU	RG	REF	Gaul- liste	Other	None	Don't know	Total
Percentage of total sample:	8.71	19.58	3.01	2.42	9.92	16.84	2.56	19.53	17.06	100.00
DK., no reply	23.71	14.68	19.40	7.41	9.05	12.27	15.79	22.30	41.32	20.48
Speeded up	33.51	41.06	49.25	46.30	46.15	39.47	49.12	28.51	24.47	35.92
No change	37.11	40.60	28.36	42.59	42.53	45.33	31.58	43.45	32.37	39.87
Slowed down	5.67	3.44	2.99	1.85	2.26	1.87	3.51	4.83	1.32	3.10

Question: In the future, for the unification of Europe, which of the following formulas are you more in favor of?

1. Create some sort of European Government to which each national government delegates a large part of its powers.
2. Establish closer ties between the member state of the European Union but without a European Government.
3. Maintain the degree of national independence (existing today).

NETHERLANDS

	CPN 0.85% of tctal sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	7.69	11.95
Create a European Govt.	38.46	30.53
Closer ties, no govt.	15.38	30.87
Maintain status quo	38.46	26.64

DENMARK

	SFP 8.51% of total sample	Total
Don't know, no reply	5.88	7.76
Create a European govt.	4.90	8.09
Closer ties, no govt.	23.53	27.36
Maintain status quo	65.69*	56.80

* highest percentage for this formula of any Danish political party.

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